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ABORTION, ETHICS, AND THE COMMON
GOOD: WHO ARE WE? WHAT DO WE
WANT? HOW DO WE GET THERE?
ROBERT J. ARAUJO, S.J.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In truth, I am as distressed as the Court is-and expressed my
distress several years ago [in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices] about the "political pressure" directed to the Court: the
marches, the mail, the protests aimed at inducing us to change our
opinions. How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens (good
people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on
various sides of other issues as well) think that we Justices should
properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged
not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of
social consensus. The Court would profit, I think, from giving less
attention to the fact of this distressing phenomenon, and more atten-
tion to the cause of it. That cause permeates today's opinion: a new
mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and
traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court
calls "reasoned judgment" .. . which turns out to be nothing but
philosophical predilection and moral intuition.1
"For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today,
the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies.
But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."2
[A]lthough pro-life forces prevail in some states, pro-choice
forces in others, there is no sense in which one can say that the two
sides are holding a dialogue. Because they can see no common
ground, then, there is a political void to match the void in scholar-
ship.... The implication is that the two sides in this battle should
* Lecturer in law at Boston College Law School; A.B. 1970 and J.D. 1973, Georgetown
University; LL.M. 1990 and J.S.D. 1992 Columbia University; M.Div. and S.T.L. 1994, Weston
School of Theology.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
2. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
be talking to each other rather than at or past each other, a lovely
vision of the role of public moral dialogue in the liberal state.'
The starting point for a discussion about abortion ought to be the
frank recognition that the issue is life or death. To abort a fetus is to
kill; to prevent the realization of a human life. But to say that much
is not to answer the moral question involved. We (Americans) have
just completed a war in which we killed many thousands of people,
some of whom were civilians, others of whom were exposed to dan-
ger against their will. That we choose to kill does not make it wrong
on that score alone; but we surely need a vocabulary for talking
about life and death issues in moral terms that underscore the seri-
ousness of any choice for death. Our experience with abortion, and
perhaps with war, suggests that the lack of such a vocabulary will
lead inevitably to excess. Religion has served for many hundreds of
years to offer some hope in the face of despair, to offer life in the face
of inevitable suffering and death. We discard those traditions at our
peril.4
Although the previous remarks originate from different sources, each
involves the issue of human life and the question of abortion in American
society. Each statement also reveals something about different perspectives
concerning the subject of abortion. I believe that each of these statements
provides a different approach for assessing two major components of the
abortion issue. These components are: (1) the ethical issues and (2) the
question of the common good.
Almost twenty years ago in Roe v. Wade,' the American legal and judi-
cial communities, as well as the American public at large, became engaged
in the public debate about the legality of abortion. This debate has not
abated. The subject of abortion continues to raise many critical issues mer-
iting investigation and discussion (for example, whether the fetus is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the U.S. and state constitutions). I shall
examine two areas involving ethics and the common good in the context of
a particular state control on abortion rights. This legislative effort imposes
the modest restrictions of a twenty-four hour waiting period and informed
consent requirements.
In Part II of my investigation, I shall address the medical matters in-
volved. Part III will frame the investigation in the context of the legal is-
3. Stephen L. Carter, Abortion, Absolutism, and Compromise, 100 YALE L.J. 2747, 2749,
2765 (1991) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).
4. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology, and Abor-
tion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1137-38 (1991) (emphasis added).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818
(1992).
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sues. Part IV will investigate the legal questions in the context of principle-
based ethics. Since I find the principle-based ethical approach insufficient, I
will proceed to re-examine the ethical questions in the context of a virtue-
based ethics in Part V. At this stage, I suggest to the reader that a virtue-
based ethics approach effectively raises the subject of the common good that
principle-based ethics do not. Consequently, Part V will look at the ques-
tion of the common good as it relates to informed consent laws regulating
abortion.
II. THE MEDICAL ISSUES AND THEIR EVALUATION
The issue of abortion will often raise questions about the medical status
of the human fetus. An episode of the popular and thought-provoking tele-
vision series Star Trek- The Next Generation6 has Lieutenant Commander
Data, the android science officer, inquiring of the ship's physician, "Doctor,
what is life?" This question is raised when Data discovers that a small,
robotic device has developed the ability to think, reproduce, and protect
itself. We can apply a parallel question to this inquiry emerging from the
investigations of medical ethics and the common good: What is fetal life?
In answering this question, it is helpful to obtain a fundamental under-
standing of human development that begins with the reaction between the
sperm and the ovum. Once the sperm encounters the ovum, the process of
fertilization begins. Fertilization does not take place immediately when the
sperm penetrates the surface of the ovum; it is the beginning of the process
called syngamy during which the sperm completes its penetration and ex-
change with the ovum.7 That stage takes approximately twelve to twenty-
four hours to complete.' At the syngamy stage of development, the result-
ing entity is called a zygote. 9
According to authors Shannon and Wolter, fertilization accomplishes
four things in human embryonic development: (1) It gives the pre-embryo
its own complete set of forty-six chromosomes, (2) it determines chromo-
somal sex, (3) it establishes genetic variability, and (4) it initiates the cell
division of the zygote that is now called the pre-embryo.10 As cell division
6. Star Trek. The Next Generation: The Quality of Life (Syndicated television broadcast, fall
1992).
7. See Thomas A. Shannon & Allen B. Walter, Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-
Embryo, 51 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 603, 607 (1990); see also Bev Rosenwaks & Owen K. Davis, In
Vitro Fertilization and Related Techniques, in DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 821,
831-32 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Shannon & Walter, supra note 7, at 607.
9. Id
10. Id. at 606-07.
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occurs, the pre-embryo travels through the fallopian tube and reaches the
uterus around the sixth or seventh day where it commences the implanta-
tion process.I On or about day fourteen, the implantation process is com-
pleted upon the initiation of "primitive utero-placental circulation."12
Shannon and Wolter also note that the pre-embryo at this stage is still "ca-
pable of dividing into multiple entities," i.e., it can divide into human twins,
triplets, etc. 13 At some point during the third week, the possibility of divi-
sion into multiple entities ceases, and the layering process that results in the
development of tissues and organs of a distinct human entity (the embryo)
begins.14 Moreover, in the third week of development the embryo's "car-
diovascular system reaches a functional state."'15
I return to my variation of Commander Data's question and rephrase it
into the related question: When does human life begin? While recognizing
that disagreements exist among scholars, Shannon and Wolter argue that
once biological development results in the formation of the zygote, there is
"a living entity which has the genotype of the human species." 16 Moreover,
the zygote is the "precursor of all that follows."17 Richard McCormick
acknowledges that the zygote is "a new hereditary constitution" that has
"the potential to become an adult."1" In agreeing with the view of Shannon
and Wolter, McCormick concludes that "developmental individuality or
singleness" is established once the attachment to the uterine wall is com-
pleted.' 9 Shannon, Wolter, and McCormick concur that a distinction must
be made between genetic individuality (the fertilized ovum) and develop-
mental individuality.20 There is some chance that the genetically unique
life implanted on the mother's uterine wall may further divide so that twins,
triplets, or other multiple births will result. However, once human develop-
ment reaches this stage (usually in the third week), when the possibility of
11. Id.
12. Id. at 608 (quoting KEITH L. MOORE, ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 14 (1988)).
13. See id. at 608 (relying on BRUCE CARLSON, PATTEN'S FOUNDATIONS OF EMBRYOLOGY
35 (1988)).
14. Id. at 609 (relying on CARLSON, supra note 13, at 186).
15. Id. at 609 (relying on MOORE, supra note 12, at 24).
16. Id. at 611.
17. Id.
18. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Who or What Is the Preembryo?, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS
J. 1, 3 (1991).
19. Id. at 4.
20. See id. at 4; Shannon & Wolter, supra note 7, at 612-14.
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multiple births ceases, the ontological unity (developmental individuality) of
a distinct human being is established.2"
The reasonable response to the question "when does human life begin?"
is consequently bifurcated: (1) genetically unique human life begins with the
completion of fertilization of the ovum by the sperm (about eighteen to
twenty-four hours after the sperm's initial penetration of the ovum), and (2)
ontologically unique human life begins during the third week after comple-
tion of fertilization. With the completion of fertilization (day one), it may
be said that a genetically unique human entity, distinct from the genotype
of the mother and father, exists. At the conclusion of the third week after
fertilization, there exists an ontologically unique human being who will re-
main distinct from any sibling who may join this human in a multiple birth.
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES
The questions of ethics and the common good arise in the context of the
State of Pennsylvania's legislative efforts to impose the modest restriction of
a twenty-four hour waiting period and informed consent requirement on
women who seek an abortion. This legislation was at the center of one of
the major legal issues in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.22 Planned Parenthood challenged the legality of the
informed consent requirement in the Pennsylvania statute on the basis that
it placed illegal burdens on a woman seeking an abortion.23 Justices
21. See Shannon & Wolter, supra note 7, at 612, 622 (relying on NORMAN M. FORD, WHEN
DID I BEGIN?. CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL IN HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCI-
ENCE 158, 212 (1988)).
22. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
23. Id. The relevant portions of the statute read in part:
(a) General Rule.-No abortion shall be performed or induced except with the volun-
tary and informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed or
induced. Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to an abortion is voluntary
and informed if and only if-
(1) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the
abortion or the referring physician has orally informed the woman of:
(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and the risk and
alternatives to the procedure or treatment that a reasonable patient would consider mate-
rial to the decision of whether or not to undergo the abortion.
(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abor-
tion is to be performed.
(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.
(2) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the
abortion or the referring physician, or a qualified physician assistant, health care practi-
tioner, technician or social worker to whom the responsibility has been delegated by either
physician, has informed the pregnant woman that:
1993]
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O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter24 along with Justices Scalia, White,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist25 agreed that the informed consent
requirement was valid, and voted to uphold it. Only Justices Stevens and
Blackmun believed that the informed consent provision constituted an "un-
due burden" on the pregnant woman, and therefore should have invalidated
the provision.26 Until new Justices are appointed to the Court, it is unlikely
that the present Court will revoke a similar informed consent require-
ment.27 In order to assess the ethical questions and the subjects of the com-
mon good that evolve from the Casey decision, it is essential to obtain a
general understanding of Roe v. Wade,28 the abortion case that paved the
way for virtually all legal discussion on this topic for over the last twenty
years.
(i) The department publishes printed materials which describe the unborn
child and list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and that she has a right to
review the printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her free of charge if she
chooses to review it.
(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, child-
birth and neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such
assistance is contained in the printed materials published by the department.
(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her
child, even in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape,
this information may be omitted.
(3) A copy of the printed materials has been provided to the woman if she
chooses to view these materials.
(4) The pregnant woman certifies in writing, prior to the abortion, that the infor-
mation required to be provided under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) has been provided.
(b) Emergency.- Where a medical emergency compels the performance of an abor-
tion, the physician shall inform the woman, prior to the abortion if possible, of the medical
indications supporting his judgment that an abortion is necessary to avert her death or to
avert substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily functions.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West Supp. 1990).
In the definitions contained in § 3203, a "medical emergency" is defined as:
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so com-
plicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abor-
tion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of
substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West Supp. 1990).
24. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
25. Id. at 2855, 2868 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 2843, 2852 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Mississippi Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 8, 1992, at A22. A group of Mississippi physicians challenged their state's informed consent
statute, which paralleled the Pennsylvania statute reviewed in Casey. Id. In the Mississippi case,
Barnes v. Moore, No. 92-588, the physicians alleged an "undue burden" existed because the rural
nature of Mississippi and the location of abortion clinics in only two counties presented "logistical
problems" that exacerbated the requirements of the waiting period. Id.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2818 (1992).
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Under the framework of Roe, the legal questions of abortion in the
United States are usually framed by two main issues: (1) the privacy right of
the individual woman29 to bodily and reproductive autonomy and (2) the
state's interest to protect developing (fetal) human life.30 Although I shall
examine more fully the competition between these two positions in my sub-
sequent discussion of the common good in Part VI, it is important to re-
count what the Supreme Court actually said about abortion rights in Roe.
The majority31 of the Court constructed a compromise position giving "the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient," the right to terminate
the pregnancy during the first trimester without "regulation by the state."'32
The majority's recognition of the physician-patient consultation reveals
some understanding about the process of informed consent pertaining to
abortion.
The majority did not accept the argument of the appellant Roe (Norma
McCorvey) 33 that "she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever
time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses."34 Roe
established the rule that the qualified right to abort the fetus during the first
trimester belongs to the pregnant woman's physician, not to the woman
herself. If the woman has a right to an abortion, it is based on the physi-
cian's right, which in turn is established by the physician's medicaljudg-
ment that an abortion should be performed. The woman's right, in short, is
qualified by the physician's right; her right is conditioned by and dependent
on the physician's right. Under Roe, the woman has no right to an abortion
that is independent of the physician's determination as based on his or her
"medical opinion."
Curiously, as the subject of abortion rights continued to be litigated in
succeeding cases, this crucial holding in Roe (i.e., the legality of an abortion
is "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision" for which the basic re-
sponsibility "must rest with the physician") began to blur.35
29. Under Roe, the right is actually that of the doctor; however, it has been extended to the
woman in other cases. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
31. The majority opinion was subscribed to by Justices Blackmun (who wrote the opinion),
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices White and
Rehnquist dissented.
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
33. See E.J. Dione, Jr., On Both Sides, Advocates Predict a 50-State Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 1989, at All.
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. To put any doubt of this to rest, Chief Justice Burger, who joined
the majority in Roe, stated in his concurring opinion in the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 208 (1973), that "[p]lainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution
requires abortions on demand."
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
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By the time Webster36 and Casey were decided, Justice Blackmun had
departed from the original premise upon which judicially declared abortion
rights had been established. In Webster, Justice Blackmun opined in the
first paragraph of his separate opinion (joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall) that "[tioday, Roe v. Wade, ... and the fundamental constitu-
tional right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive
but are not secure."37 One earlier indication that some members of the
Court were gradually expanding the qualified abortion rights established in
Roe came in 1986 in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists.3" As he did in Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority
of the Court. In his Thornburgh opinion, he stated, "Again today, we reaf-
firm the general principles laid down in Roe."'39 And what might those
principles be? Justice Blackmun redefined them as including "the constitu-
tional principles.., for recognizing the constitutional dimensions of a wo-
man's right to decide whether to end her pregnancy."' Although he joined
the majority in Roe, Chief Justice Burger noted the substantive change in
what the Court held in Thornburgh to be the woman's right-a right that
became more distant from the one in Roe because it became independent of
the physician's limited right.
The Chief Justice, noting this significant development and departure
from Roe, dissented in Thornburgh:
I based my concurring statements in Roe... on the principle ex-
pressed in the Court's opinion in Roe that the right to an abortion
"is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation." In short, every Member of the Roe Court
rejected the idea of abortion on demand. The Court's opinion today,
however, plainly undermines that important principle ......
In spite of this acknowledgment of what Roe stood for-and, perhaps more
important, does not stand for-Justice Blackmun complained that the plu-
rality decision in Webster sympathized with those individuals who "would
do away with Roe explicitly."'42 A major part of Justice Blackmun's con-
cern was that the Webster plurality is "oblivious or insensitive to the fact
36. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
37. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
38. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2823 (1992).
39. Id. at 759.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55).
42. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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that millions of women, and their families, have ordered their lives around
the right to reproductive choice, and that this right has become vital to the
full participation of women in the economic and political walks of American
life "' Justice Blackmun also exemplified the altered understanding of Roe
when he concluded the dissenting portion of his opinion with a warning:
"For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today, the
women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the
signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."" Justice
Blackmun, in short, took the dependent right of the woman and made it
independent of the physician's right. This was an unwarranted extension of
the Roe compromise about which Chief Justice Burger warned in his
Thornburgh dissent.
But the legal turmoil about what was decided in Roe and what rights
that decision conferred did not stop in 1989 with Webster. It continued in
Casey.4 While my principal examination and analysis of the Casey decision
involving the informed consent requirement will occur in Part V, I raise
here the highlights of this case that are relevant to the discussion thus far.
In Casey, Justice Blackmun initiated a new line of discussion in the Roe
context when he presented his "steadfast... belief that the right to repro-
ductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court before
Webster."'  He pointed out that the Court reaffirmed "the long recognized
rights of privacy and bodily integrity" with judicial precedent dating back
to 1891. 47 But Justice Blackmun again departed from the discussion of the
attending physician's rights of Roe when he argued in Casey that "continua-
tion of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity" and
that the restrictions on terminating a pregnancy imposed by the Penn-
sylvania informed consent law "deprive[ ] a woman of the right to make her
own decisions about reproduction and family planning."48 Conspicuous by
its absence from Justice Blackmun's discussion was any reaffirmation of the
attending physician's exercise of medical judgment, which constituted the
heart of the legality of a first trimester abortion under Roe.
Justice Stevens made an interesting observation at the outset of his con-
curring and dissenting opinion in Casey when he stated that "[tihe societal
costs of overruling Roe at this late date would be enormous. Roe is an
integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and
43. Id. at 557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the basic equality of men and women."4 9 Absent from his discussion was
the crucial language establishing that the woman's abortion rights were de-
fined by and dependent on the qualified physician's rights, which had to be
substantiated by the physician's medical judgment, not by concern for gen-
der equality or "reproductive autonomy."50 The fundamental holding of
Roe that the permissibility of a first trimester abortion is based on the at-
tending physician's professional medical judgment has, in the understand-
ing of some of the Justices (and many abortion advocates), been supplanted
by a new doctrine: "[A] woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is
nothing less than a matter of conscience."51
As an aside, it should be noted that matters of conscience that emerge
from religious belief are, in the minds of Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
inappropriate because of the Establishment Clause prohibition of the First
Amendment. 2 It can, of course, be argued that the kinds of activities or
beliefs that concern these two members of the Court could well be protected
by the Free Exercise Clause. I submit that the concern of these two mem-
bers of the Court about the establishment question is unfounded. Religious
as well as secular members of American society share moral views on im-
portant topics such as abortion, war, the environment, discrimination, and
health care. Laurence Tribe,5 3 Michael Perry,54 Ruth Colker,55 and Eliza-
49. Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Justice Stevens opined that the adoption of views which parallel those of religious groups
would constitute an unlawful establishment of religion. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2839 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
568 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
53. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 116 (1990).
54. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 116-19 (1991).
55. See generally Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion,
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989). While I do not agree with all of Colker's positions, I
join her concern about the need for dialogue among those who hold opposing views on the subject
of abortion. Neither the bombing of clinics nor the persecution of peaceful pro-life demonstrators
helps the cause of rational and civil discourse that is sorely needed to protect all human life. Such
discourse is essential, I believe, to moral resolution of the questions surrounding abortion. I note
with both sadness and concern that Colker has expressed certain opinions about some of my own
views published elsewhere. In her article An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproduc-
tive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 328 n.15, she argues that I
have offered "an especially insensitive account of the impact of reproductive decisions on women's
lives." In writing my article Fetal Jurisprudence-A Debate in the Abstract, 33 CATH. LAW. 203
(1990), I wrote about the subject of abortion from the perspective of fetal interests. Considering
the plethora of articles addressing the subject from a woman's perspective, I considered it respon-
sible then, as I do now, to contribute to the debate arguing fetal interests, which have been
presented less frequently. It should be kept in mind that the views of some pro-abortion advo-
[Vol. 76:701
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beth Mensch and Alan Freeman56 generally agree that involvement by reli-
gious groups in the public debate on abortion and other important issues,
and the government's adoption of some of their views, do not automatically
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.17 I maintain, as do these
authors, that individuals and groups who speak out of their religious con-
victions permissibly contribute to the formation of the public conscience on
questions containing moral implications.58 It is the "matter of conscience"
raised by Justice Stevens that prompts an investigation at this stage into the
ethical questions surrounding the informed consent provision. I propose to
examine initially the ethical questions associated with the issue from the
basis of principles. These principles are four in number: (1) autonomy,
(2) nonmaleficence, (3) beneficence, and (4) justice. Ultimately, I conclude
in Part IV that these principles fail to adequately address the ethical issues
concerning abortion. They leave a void in the discourse of the ethical con-
siderations about abortion. Consequently, I re-examine in Part V these eth-
ical questions about abortion-in light of the specific issue of informed
consent-within the framework of virtue ethics. I shall find that an ethics
cates, while sensitive to the interests of women, can be construed as being "insensitive" to the
fetus. I do not find that tacking this or any label on those with whom Colker or I do not share
outlooks productive in reconciling the opposing views involved in the debate about human abor-
tion. To suggest that I am "insensitive" comes as an unwelcome and unjustified surprise. The
remark that my article may be "insensitive" fails to acknowledge that, in addition to presenting
the interests of the fetus, I also addressed the interest of the woman. I pointed out that "there is a
second entity who shares with the woman the interest of self-preservation and further develop-
ment." Id. at 230. I would not want any reader of Colker's work or mine to forget that I raised
the obligations that our society has to care for both the woman and the fetus. Many of the
problems surrounding this difficult question have devastating consequences for both the mother
and the fetus. Moreover, these problems contribute to the tragedy
which has much to do with the ability or inability of our society to treat its current and
future members in a humane way that guarantees all members of the human race those
essentials of a productive human life.... The solution to the problem is not the taking of
life. Rather, the solution is making available that which life needs, the essential goods and
services that cultivate productive lives and promote human flourishing.
Id. at 233 (emphasis added). My position is that the life and flourishing interests of the woman
are important, as are those of the fetus. Colker's further remarks about the "abstract" argument
and my hiding behind "a veil of ignorance" are misplaced. The use of the word abstract in the
title was chosen to indicate that the debate between two advocateswas abstract, Le., it really did
not take place; however, the issues that they discuss and debate are real. The suggestion that I am
"hiding behind a veil of ignorance" is unfortunate, particularly in view of my recognition that the
question of life and human flourishing extends to both the woman and the child she bears.
56. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1102.
57. I have treated this subject in much greater detail elsewhere. See Robert Araujo, S.J., A
Dialogue Between the Church and Caesar: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Religion Clauses,
34 B.C. L. REV. 493 (1993).
58. See also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6,
227-28 (1988).
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based on virtue rather than principles leads to a fuller, better understanding
of moral concerns associated with the informed consent regulation of abor-
tion. Moreover, it is from the context of virtue ethics that we begin to see
the subject of the common good as it surfaces from the legal and moral
questions that extend from informed consent regulations.
IV. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE REGULATION OF ABORTION
At the outset of this portion of the discussion, I acknowledge that there
are attractive elements of a principle-based ethical theory. Specific attrac-
tions will emerge from the examination of the four principles that I have
outlined at the conclusion of Part III. Both principle-based and virtue-
based ethical theories generally share a common element: justice. I suggest
at this point in my discussion that the component of justice in ethical theo-
ries, as well as the search for justice in practice, brings us to a more effective
understanding of how virtue-based ethics can raise our consciousness about
the common good. In turn, an examination of the common good can pro-
vide American society of the late twentieth century with a desirable means
of minimizing the entrenched, absolute positions that emerge from many
ardent pro-choice and pro-life proponents. In short, I suggest here that a
virtue-based ethics theory applied to informed consent abortion regulation
can, at this stage in the national debate of a difficult issue, provide hope not
only for minimizing conflict but also maximizing the opportunity of achiev-
ing the good for all concerned with the question of abortion. I now turn to
my examination of the first ethical principle: autonomy.
A. The Principle of Autonomy
The principle of autonomy can theoretically be defined as "self rule."
The notion of autonomy is based on the Greek roots autos (self) and nomos
(rule).5 9 In the context of biomedical ethics, autonomy can be viewed as the
principle based on "reflective individual choice" that is sometimes qualified
by an authority (e.g., a combination of professional medical advice and legal
responsibilities, or by "tradition, or social morality").6" In general, author-
ity does not constrain autonomous decision-making.6 It is important to
recognize that informed consent is a crucial component of the exercise of
autonomy by individuals making medical and health care decisions.62 A
59. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67
(1989).
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id. at 74.
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decision made by a patient is not considered to be autonomous if compre-
hensive disclosures about medical procedures and their known effects are
not made, if there is inadequate understanding about the information de-
rived from these disclosures by the person making the autonomous deci-
sion, if the decision is not voluntary, and if the person lacks the requisite
competence to make the decision.63 In the context of abortion, a variety of
attitudes about autonomy prevail.
In Roe, while there was some discussion about the relationship between
the woman and the attending physician (which may suggest the need for
informed consent before an abortion can be performed), the privacy lan-
guage that permeates the decision can insulate the woman's autonomy from
review by those people (for example, the state) who see a need to protect the
interests of the fetus and balance them against those of the pregnant wo-
man." If we see a need to question the woman's autonomous decision to
have an abortion and this autonomy's independence from the fetus's inter-
ests, we need only re-examine some of the judicial discussion in Casey65 or
Webster66 in which the woman's autonomy is insulated from most external
controls. In reviewing the nature of a woman's autonomy to abort her
child, investigators have arrived at a variety of conclusions about the nature
and extent of her autonomy.
James Gustafson, while generally favoring protection of human fetuses
from abortion,67 is willing to grant the pregnant woman who is the victim of
"sexual crime" the right to abort the fetus if she is "convinced" that it is
"right" to do so.68 Gustafson believes that moralists must honor a woman's
"personal responsibility"; consequently, in his estimation, she cannot be co-
erced into making a decision that contravenes her own sense of responsibil-
ity. Any concern about the extent to which the woman's autonomy can be
detrimental to the genetic and ontological existence of the fetus is elimi-
nated in the absolute case made for a woman's autonomy by Mary Anne
63. Id. at 78-79. Beauchamp and Childress organize the informed consent process by group-
ing the components under three categories: (1) Threshold element concerns competence, (2) in-
formation elements include (a) disclosure of information and (b) the understanding of that
information, and (3) the consent elements consist of (a) voluntariness and (b) authorization. Id. at
79.
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
65. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, Brennan, &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. James M. Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Approach, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION:
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 101, 112 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
68. Id. at 116.
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Warren. 69 By excluding the fetus as a member of the human community,
Warren argues that the pregnant woman has the moral ability and auton-
omy "to protect her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life, by termi-
nating an unwanted pregnancy" and that this right "will always override
whatever right to life it may be appropriate to ascribe to a fetus, even a fully
developed one." 0
So far, the concerns about autonomy focus on its exercise by the preg-
nant woman. However, the Catholic Church, through its Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), has addressed the principle of autonomy
in a different way. The CDF views this issue quite broadly by looking at
every human's autonomy-the pregnant woman or the fetus. The Church
constructs its understanding about human autonomy in the context of the
human right to life. The right to life is, for the Church, a fundamental
principle, the "condition of all others," because:
It does not belong to society, nor does it belong to public authority
in any form to recognize this right for some and not for others: all
discrimination is evil, whether it be founded on race, sex, colour, or
religion. It is not recognition by another that constitutes this right.
This right is antecedent to its recognition; it demands recognition
and it is strictly unjust to refuse it.71
With the exception of the CDF's understanding of autonomy in the con-
text of abortion, each of the other views already mentioned looks at the
subject from the perspective of the woman and--depending on the sur-
rounding circumstances-her autonomous choice to abort a pregnancy with
little or no objection from anyone else. On the other hand, the CDF's view
can, even in situations when the mother's life is threatened by the fetus,
allow the "autonomy" of the fetus to trump the "autonomy" of the mother.
We begin to see how the exercise of autonomy can adversely affect the inter-
ests of others. For example, the absolute exercise of the woman's auton-
omy, which Warren is willing to grant, can bring great harm to the fetus by
prejudicing its right to live. On the other hand, the CDF's position does
not address the difficult case of the harm that the pregnant woman faces
when her health is prejudiced by the continued presence of the fetus.72
69. Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43 (1973),
reprinted in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 464-69 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty eds, 2d ed.
1986).
70. Id. at 469 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
71. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Quaestiode Abortu, in VATICAN
COUNCIL II: MORE POSTCONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 441, 445 (1982) [hereinafter Declaration on
Procured Abortion].
72. This statement is not to be construed as a justification to abort the pregnancy when the
mother's life is threatened.
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Those of us interested in applying ethics to the question of abortion should
also be concerned with the harm to another that the exercise of autonomy
can produce. While we may disagree on which harms are to be avoided and
whose interests are to be protected, we probably agree that harm is to be
avoided. Consequently, I shall turn to the principle of nonmaleficence and
the contribution it makes to this segment of my investigation.
B. The Principle of Nonmaleficence
Put simply, the principle of nonmaleficence means do no harm.7 3 On
first examination, the norm of avoiding harm seems rather attractive. Most
ethical persons harbor the general notion that no one should harm another.
However, an examination of authors who treat this principle reveals that
this principle, while attractive by itself, raises questions about the contribu-
tions it can make to ethical discourse concerning abortion when we realize
that it inadequately deals with the underlying question of: Who is harmed?
For example, in the majority opinion in Roe, the Court pointed to the
harm that the woman may face if her pregnancy is to continue.74 Within a
narrow application of the principle of nonmaleficence, it might be ethical to
abort the fetus in order to prohibit harm to the woman if she is endangered
by the pregnancy. However, the Roe majority opinion failed to reconcile the
harm that the aborted fetus will permanently suffer if removed from the
mother's womb by the abortion. James Gustafson presents the case in
which the pregnancy is the result of the woman's gang rape by her es-
tranged husband and his accomplices; but like the majority in Roe, Gustaf-
son is more concerned about avoiding harm to the woman than harm to the
fetus.75 Warren's concern about avoiding harm is focused solely on the
pregnant woman: The only harm to be avoided is the harm that may befall
her (the prejudice and harm that befalls the fetus-while perhaps unfortu-
nate-is inconsequential).7 6 The view of Warren is countered by the CDF,
which acknowledges the irreversible harm suffered by the fetus during an
abortion. The CDF contends that the harm to the fetus can only be
avoided through the prohibition of abortion.77 But just as Warren is not
73. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 120, 194.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
75. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 107, 116.
76. Warren, supra note 69, at 469.
77. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 443-44. In his encyclical letter,
Humanae Vitae (Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Births), in VATICAN COUNCIL II: MORE
POSTCONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 404 (1982), Pope Paul VI urged the principle of doing no harm to
human procreation by avoiding the direct interruption of the generative process.
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concerned about the harm done to the fetus, the CDF does not address the
harm that may be suffered by the continuation of a life-threatening
pregnancy.
As admirable as the principle of avoiding harm is, it does have limita-
tions-particularly when it is only applied to one interest (that of the preg-
nant woman or the fetus) but not both. What constitutes the avoidance of
harm for one (and therefore good for the protection of that individual's
interests) may be prejudicial to the other. Thus, if we turn to the positive
effort to do good (as opposed to the avoidance of doing harm), we might
obtain a better principle to address the question of abortion.
C. The Principle of Beneficence
Beneficence is the affirmative course of action one takes to do and
achieve good. It "require[s] positive acts to assist others."78 Beauchamp
and Childress suggest that beneficence has two components. The first is a
positive component that mandates "the provision of benefits (including the
prevention and removal of harm as well as the promotion of welfare)." 7 9
The second element is the utilitarian component of beneficence that "re-
quires a balancing of benefits and harms."80 Whereas nonmaleficence re-
quires that a person refrain from doing something (i.e., harm), beneficence
imposes an affirmative obligation to take some action that will achieve a
desirable, good result.8" The obligation exists even when there is no legal
obligation to do so.82 How is the principle of beneficence applied in the
literature that I have been using concerning the topic of abortion?
In the Roe majority opinion, there is a weak form of beneficence defined
and applied in the context of giving the physician the legal protection from
prosecution when he or she performs a first trimester abortion that is justi-
fied by his or her medical opinion. 3 A contradiction immediately surfaces
in the application of the beneficence principle because the effort by the phy-
sician to do good for the pregnant woman harms the fetus. This contradic-
tion also appears in the example developed by Gustafson when action is
78. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 194.
79. Id. at 195.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 198.
82. Id. at 205; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 16-88 (1991) (discussing a moral obligation to take action like the Good
Samaritan even though there is no legal obligation to do so).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
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taken to help the woman who has been gang raped. 4 The obligation to do
what is good for the woman is highly prejudicial to the fetus. The strong
obligation that emerges from Warren's notion of beneficence to do whatever
is necessary to help the woman simultaneously supplies the harm that the
fetus will suffer from the obligation to terminate the ptegnancy.85
Interestingly, the CDF acknowledges that there may be some kind of
obligation to assist a pregnant woman when it mentions the need "to free
[women] from all unjust discrimination."86 However, the CDF simultane-
ously imposes an absolute obligation to do good for the fetus by pointing
out that discrimination against the fetus must be combatted by banning
abortion.8 7 Beauchamp and Childress observe that the exercise of benefi-
cence can be paternalistic and thereby conflict with the exercise of auton-
omy."8 In other words, the obligation to protect the fetus as advocated by
the CDF constitutes a form of paternalism89 that challenges the first trimes-
ter autonomy of the attending physician and her patient by imposing an
absolute obligation to protect the fetus from the discrimination of abortion.
Again, we see that the good that comes from one kind of beneficence
may conflict with the good that comes from obligations imposed by other
applications of beneficence. Do principle-based ethics offer any resolution
of these competing efforts to seek different goods? Perhaps the principle of
justice might offer some help, if not a solution, to this predicament that
emerges from the applications of the first three principles.
D. The Principle of Justice
Justice has been understood through a wide range of definitions. For
Socrates, it was The Good.90 For Aristotle, it included true friendship. 91
For Mill, it was the utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the largest
number.92 For H.L.A. Hart, justice is treating like cases alike.93 For
84. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 116.
85. Warren, supra note 69, at 469; see also Judith J. Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL.
& PUB. AFt. 47 (1971).
86. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 446.
87. Id. at 445.
88. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 209-27.
89. Id. at 218-19.
90. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Desmond Lee trans., 1974).
91. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 502 (Richard Mc-
Keon ed., Modem Library 1992) (1947).
92. JOHN S. MILL, Utilitarianism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL: ETHICAL,
POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS 321, 335 (1961).
93. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961).
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Rawls, it is the exercise of fairness.94 For John Finnis, justice is, among
other things, the realization of basic human goods for one's self as well as
for others.95 Others have seen justice as a synthesis of rewards, punish-
ments, and entitlements.96 Hart's understanding of justice (like cases being
treated alike, different cases being treated differently) constitutes what has
been termed as "formal justice." Thomas Aquinas identified several types
of justice: (1) the private arrangement between two parties may be under-
stood as "commutative justice"; (2) the just distribution of goods, services,
etc. based on needs is "distributive justice." '97 One other type of justice
referred to by commentators is social or general justice: the proper order-
ing of society to minimize and eliminate conflict so that individuals and
groups are treated with the respect and dignity that would be accorded
every other individual and group.98
In turning to the sources cited earlier to develop the first three ethical
principles, we see a variety of understandings of justice used to reconcile the
conflicts that emerge from the practice of abortion. In Roe, the majority
attempted to resolve the conflict by working out a type of calculus in which
the direct rights of the attending physician and the dependent rights of the
woman were given prominence in the first trimester of pregnancy. In the
final trimester, the state was given the preference by being able to regulate
abortion so as to protect fetal life. The middle trimester became a ground
for weighing the two interests and reaching some kind of compromise be-
tween them.99
Gustafson prefers to protect fetal life."° However, while "[life is to be
preserved rather than destroyed" and those "who cannot assert their own
rights to life are especially to be protected," there are exceptions to this
rule. 1' For Gustafson, justice might recognize the following exceptions to
the general rule: (1) "medical indications" mandate a therapeutic abortion;
(2) the pregnancy is the result of a "social crime"; and (3) "sexual and
94. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-14 (1971).
95. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 161 (1980).
96. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 257.
97. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Question 61, Of Commutative and Dis-
tributive Justice (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1920).
98. Id. Question 58, Of Commutative and Distributive Justice, art. 5 (Whether Justice is a
General Virtue?).
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
100. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 112.
101. Id. at 116.
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emotional conditions do not appear to be beneficial for the well-being of the
mother and child."1 °2
Since Warren asserts an absolute right of the pregnant woman to termi-
nate the pregnancy at any time, no conflict can arise challenging the wo-
man's right. If a conflict were to arise, justice would simply require
whatever is necessary to protect the woman's absolute right. Any challenge
to her right, according to Warren, would lose.
On the other hand, the CDF recognizes that "civil law cannot expect to
cover the whole field of morality or to punish all faults .... It must often
tolerate what is in fact a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater one." 
10 3
While stating that abortion can never be approved, "political action" ought
to be taken to "combat its causes" in a charitable fashion that deals effec-
tively with the human sorrow and misery that accompany those who are
most involved." 4 I consider that the position of the CDF is charitable to-
ward and understanding of the interest of the pregnant woman for whom
the pregnancy creates major, possibly even life-threatening problems. Indi-
viduals, communities, and, more formally, the state through its lawmakers
are called upon by the CDF's justice principle to help and improve these
difficult situations.105 Yet, when all is said and done, both politically and
legally, the CDF reiterates that "the life of the child takes precedence over
all opinions . .. [and o]ne cannot invoke freedom of thought to destroy
life."106 Just as Warren makes the interest of the pregnant woman absolute,
the CDF makes just as absolute the position of the fetus. The positions
taken by Warren and the CDF mark the outer boundaries of the rights that
are in conflict, but neither position can really deal with the other and reach
a solution that the other side can view as just.
Does the theory of justice espoused by either the CDF or Warren (or for
that matter, the majority opinion in Roe or the position of Gustafson) really
reconcile the conflict so that the other party or side also receives the respect
and dignity that it desires? My answer is probably not. Our civil legal
system of rules and the judgments based on those rules make winners and
losers. In the questions about life that the pregnant woman and the fetus
face, the application of rules and the judgments supplied by them will often
result in one party being the winner and the other party being the loser.
102. Id.
103. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 448.
104. Id. at 450.
105. Id. at 448-49.
106. Id.
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Infrequently, a compromise may be arrived at which gives both parties the
decision they seek.
Does this mean that there is no adequate solution founded on principle-
based ethics that can give the pregnant woman and the fetus the justice they
deserve? The conflicts between principle-based arguments advanced by the
woman or on behalf of the fetus suggest not. My point here is not to re-
make a principle-based ethical system that will provide such justice. The
task would be Herculean. Rather, I propose to look for the answer to this
conflict of absolutes'0 7 in a virtue-based ethical system, for I believe that
virtue-based ethics is an appropriate realm within which we might find a
more satisfactory solution to the question of abortion. The transition be-
tween principles-based ethics and virtue-based ethics is the concept of jus-
tice that is a component of both ethical systems. Thus, I now turn to the
contribution virtue ethics can make to the question I have been examining.
I suggest at this stage that the development of a virtue ethics will offer a
better way of addressing the issue of abortion. Moreover, it should provide
a consistent and coherent approach to dealing with the important issues and
interests at stake. Perhaps above all else, virtue ethics will-unlike princi-
ple-based ethics-consider more comprehensively the spectrum of interests
and experiences at stake in the matter of abortion.
V. VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE REGULATION OF ABORTION
The title of this Article raises three questions: (1) Who are we? (2) What
do we want? (3) How do we get there? These questions are derived from
Alasdair MacIntyre's seminal work, After Virtue."°' If the function of eth-
ics is to guide us toward right action,10 9 virtue ethics engages us as moral
agents who are seeking to make ourselves better moral agents in the fu-
ture.110 At the heart of both the future of the moral agent and the second
question posed by MacIntyre (i.e., where do we want to go?, or, what do we
want?) is a goal, a telos. 1' As James Keenan stresses, "[o]nly in virtue
ethics is a telos constitutive of method; no other ethical system can make
107. See generally TRIBE, supra note 53.
108. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
109. See James F. Keenan, S.J., Virtue Ethics: Making a Case as It Comes of Age, 67
THOUGHT 115 (1992).
110. Id. at 116.
111. MACINTYRE, supra note 108, at 189. "[There is a telos which transcends the limited
goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life
conceived as a unity .... Id.; see Keenan, supra note 109, at 120, 123; Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., An
Appeal for a Christian Virtue Ethic, 67 THOUGHT 158, 159 (1992).
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that claim.""1 2 Because we as individual humans are also social beings
whose existence is grounded in relationships with others, the concept of the
telos helps us to understand better the question advanced by MacIntyre
(Le., where do we want to go?) by placing it into a communal setting. 113
Joseph Kotva has argued that the telos of a virtue ethic is inextricably
intertwined with the means to achieve the goal because: (1) the means move
us toward a better understanding of the end; (2) the end concerns the for-
mation of a specific kind of self; and (3) the end concerns the formation of a
specific kind of society, and societies stipulate role-specific behavior." 4
In the context of the question of abortion, Kotva points out that for
some individuals, the kind of person each of us is molds the kind of moral
questions we face. 1 5 He illustrates his point with the example that the
"question of the moral appropriateness of aborting a defective fetus never
occurs to some people[; t]hey simply proceed to have and raise the
child.""' 6 His observation and conclusion suggest that the practice of vir-
tue ethics acknowledges the sense of "otherness"; that is, in making moral
decisions about who we are and what our goal is and what means we use to
get there, we necessarily think of other individuals as we work toward the
goal. The practice of virtue ethics can therefore be based on a sense of
community, on an awareness of relationship with others.
Mary Ann Glendon has recognized and addressed this discovery in the
context of the Roe decision. While the rhetoric -of the majority opinion
focused on the individual (Le., the attending physician or the pregnant wo-
man, and the individual's right to privacy)," 7 Glendon expresses her con-
cern that the interests of the other-that the concerns of the community
most involved with pregnancy and the legality and morality of abortion-
are ignored. She addresses this lacuna by stating:
The voice we hear in the Supreme Court's abortion narrative-
presenting us with the image of the pregnant woman as autonomous,
separate, and distinct from the father of the unborn child (and from
112. Keenan, supra note 109, at 123.
113. I have developed the idea of a telos underlying the social institution of law elsewhere.
See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Teleology of Law: Citizenship and Discipleship, 35 CATH. LAW. 57
(1992).
114. Kotva, supra note 111, at 159. As Kotva further suggests, "the means cannot be sepa-
rated from the end because the means are central to the end. A telos which embodies the virtues
of justice, courage, and fidelity cannot be severed from acts and social arrangements that are just,
courageous, and faithful." Id. at 160.
115. Id. at 166.
116. Id.
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
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her parents if she is a minor), and insulated from the larger society
which is not permitted even to try to dissuade her or ask her to wait
to get counseling, information, or assistance-is more distinctively
American... in its lonely individualism and libertarianism. I8
Professor Glendon has identified the problem with the ethical principles
of Roe by suggesting that insulating individuals from one another is not a
desirable way of addressing the vital question of whether a woman should
have an abortion. Glendon refers to those other individuals who can help
the pregnant woman, the fetus, and society at large if they are permitted to
participate in the deliberation. The Pennsylvania informed consent regula-
tion enables and encourages such participation. In short, Glendon's insight
identifies the core problem with the ethics of Roe. She offers a practical
solution to the problem of the insulation of the woman prompted by Roe.
In her text, she suggests a goal (which includes individuals becoming less
isolated and more community oriented) and the means to reach the goal
(how do we get there?).
At the end of my discussion on principle-based ethics I indicated that
the element of justice is a part of both principle ethics and virtue ethics.
Since justice is related to both ethical systems, I shall now address it in the
context of a virtue-based system. I also mention here that virtue ethics en-
compasses several other considerations, including the virtues of prudence,
courage, and wisdom, all of which will be addressed shortly." 9
Within the privacy rights rhetoric of Roe and the Blackmun-Stevens
opinions in Casey and Webster, the kind of justice that emerges has lost a
good deal of its goal-oriented function. The language about "justice" that
results is narrowly focused on addressing and protecting the act of abortion
on the grounds of protecting individual rights and privacy. As Glendon
points out, the social, communal, and teleological components of duties that
are the correlatives of rights are not discussed. She correctly argues that
these components are essential to deal justly with the urgent matter of abor-
tion, which has, in the American context, been cloaked with the absolute
rights of privacy, individual autonomy, and isolation. 20 To balance the
excessive and narrow focus on the rights that emerge from the principle of
autonomy, Glendon draws attention to the importance of understanding
the needs of all the parties involved: the pregnant woman, the fetus, and
118. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 52 (1987).
119. See MACINTYRE, supra note 108. The author defines a virtue as "an acquired humhn
quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are
internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods."
Id. at 178.
120. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 38.
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the community. She further suggests that a just resolution of the difficult
questions raised by abortion rests in the development, adoption, and the
sustaining of policies that encourage child bearing and the protection of
fetal life. 21 While the interests of the fetus are protected under Glendon's
proposal, the mother is also helped with concrete programs that give her
counselling, health care for herself and her child, and other assistance that
she may need.
Lisa Cahill has examined abortion beyond the constraints of principles
by probing the realm of virtue. While she understands the predicament of
many women who face unplanned pregnancies, Cahill also recognizes that
"the principal value at stake ... is the existence of the fetus itself." '122 To
deal justly with the question of abortion, it is essential for Cahill that we
first establish an understanding of who belongs to the human community
affected by abortion before the moral relationships among these members
can be addressed. 23 After ascertaining that the fetus is from its conception
a member of the human community, she, like Gustafson,1 24 adopts a
"strong bias in favor of the fetus."1 25 Cahill reveals that her ethical ap-
proach to abortion contains some elements paralleling a virtue-based
method when she shifts attention from only the woman or only the fetus
and refocuses it on "their respective rights" being "defined in relation to
one another."'
126
Another source of a virtue-based approach to the question of abortion is
the feminist legal scholar Ruth Colker. While Colker considers herself a
"pro-choice feminist,"127 she establishes a foundation for a virtue-based eth-
ics to deal with the issue of abortion. She argues "that both feminist theory
and theology can help people discover and experience their authentic
selves."1 28 This author relies on a synthesis of theology and feminism to
"guide people to the discovery and experience of their authentic self."' 129
For Colker, the goal-the telos-is realization of this authentic self: a self
121. Id. at 53-57.
122. Lisa S. Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION AND CATHOLICISM:
THE AMERICAN DEBATE 85 (1988).
123. Id.
124. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 112.
125. Cahill, supra note 122, at 86.
126. Id. at 87.
127. Colker, supra note 55, at 1046.
128. Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added). Colker uses the Buddhist term "authentic self" to
mean that "we have control over how the self changes so that we can facilitate its movements
toward our aspirations.... It is important here for the reader to understand that this conception
of the self is not static, fixed, isolated, or universal self often described in the western philosophy."
Id at 1012 n.4.
129. Id. at 1013.
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not cut off from others, insulated by some impenetrable "privacy" but,
rather, a self, who is a member of a community, who "attempt[s] to speak
aspirationally because such dialogue may enable us to overcome short-term
disagreements and move toward our common goals."' 0 In order to attain
such goals, Colker suggests that we must rely on "[d]ialogue and contem-
plation, not rhetoric."13' Colker eschews principles supportive of absolute
privacy when it comes to abortion. She relies on relationship and dialogue
in order to "approach the abortion cases from the perspective of the kind of
people and society that we want to be."' 132
Although the CDF advances a strong principle-based approach in de-
veloping its ethical response to abortion, it does raise the teleological issue
that is constitutive of virtue ethics when it addresses the role of civil law as
an instrument of justice. The CDF acknowledges that the civil law "must
often tolerate what is in fact a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater one."' 133
While this may make us pause and consider how this comment about civil
law constitutes a departure from a principle-based ethics, the CDF enters
the realm of virtue ethics when it suggests that the "role of law is not to
record what is done, but to help in promoting improvement."' 3 4 Just as
those of us who make the case for virtue ethics ask ourselves the teleological
question what do we want to become (or where do we want to go), the CDF
poses the following:
[The goal of law is] to pursue a reform of society and of conditions
of life in a milieux, starting with the most deprived, so that always
and everywhere it may be possible to give every child coming into
this world a welcome worthy of a person. Help for families and for
unmarried mothers, assured grants for children, legislation for ille-
gitimate children and reasonable arrangements for adoption-a
130. Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1045.
132. Id. at 1047. Another perspective on the need for civil discourse in the abortion debate is
offered by Teresa G. Phelps, The Sound of Silence Breaking: Catholic Women, Abortion, and the
Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 547 (1992), where the author states:
We may never live in an ideal world and we may never agree on the morality of abortion or
when human life begins. We can, nonetheless, work toward this world, an ideal world in
which empowered women live in and are supported by their community. In such a world
women are trusted to make their own choices, and both sides of the abortion debate, pro-
life and pro-choice, might be surprised at what choices they make. We can begin this
essential work by listening to each other.
Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
133. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 448.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
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whole positive policy must be put into force so that there will always
be a concrete honourable and possible alternative to abortion. 135
There is also contained within the justice component of virtue ethics the
recognition of what is the goal of society and its members. A virtuous solu-
tion to the question of abortion avoids the defect of "winner-take-all" in the
justice of a principle-based ethics. But how do we move toward the goal of
justice in virtue ethics? This is where the virtue of prudence comes into
play.
If the virtue of justice prescribes the just goal or end, then prudence is
the means to get to that end. 36 A fundamental approach to obtain the
means to the just end has been suggested by the CDF. In its discussion of
the role of civil law, the CDF recommended the promotion of improve-
ments in social structures that will simultaneously display greater charity
toward pregnant women, their families, and fetuses by making available
grants, arrangements for adoption, and other legislation that gives "con-
crete, honourable and possible alternative[s] to abortion." 137 Paralleling the
CDF's recommendations is the United States Catholic Conference's recent
election policy statement that urged voters and officials to "support public
funding policies that encourage childbirth over abortion, and... programs
that assist pregnant women and children, especially those who are poor." 138
Similar sentiments were offered eight years ago by New York Governor
Mario Cuomo.
In a speech at the University of Notre Dame on September 13, 1984,
Governor Cuomo addressed the dual nature of his position on abortion. As
a practicing Roman Catholic, he has accepted personally the teachings of
the Church and holds a "reverence" for developing human life. 139 How-
ever, as a governor of a secular state, he stated that he cannot coerce others
to accept the same beliefs that emerge from his religious tradition because
of the separation between church and state promoted by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment."4 Politics aside, Cuomo then ventured
into a realm approaching virtue ethics by raising considerations that every
135. Id. at 449.
136. Kotva, supra note 111, at 166 n.9 (acknowledging his debt to James Keenan, S.J., for
this insight).
137. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 448-49.
138. See Political Responsibility: Revitalizing American Democracy, 21 ORIGINS 313, 319
(1991).
139. Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspec-
tive, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 20-21 (1984).
140. Id. at 20-23.
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member of the secular society can reflect upon and adopt regardless of per-
sonal, religious beliefs.
These considerations contain a two-fold goal-the telos-for Cuomo.
First, "we must work to find ways to avoid abortions without otherwise
violating our faith."' 41 This search is initiated by education and sustained
by elevating the consciousness of fellow citizens through the "weapons of
the word and of love."' 42 The second goal is developing practical ways in
which alternatives to abortion are encouraged through support and assist-
ance (e.g., programs making available nutritional and pediatric care, child-
birth and post-natal care, and other relief).' 43 Cuomo's recommendations
echo those advanced by Glendon. 14 As he develops the virtue of prudence,
Cuomo also raises the virtue of courage.
Courage is the virtue that enables us to meet the challenge of harm or
danger when we attempt to do something about the care and concern we
have for individuals and communities. 45 The exercise of this virtue takes
place when the humans facing risks and needing help from others (e.g., the
fetus and the pregnant woman) can rely on the response from those others
who wish to and are prepared to help.146 Cuomo serves as one example of
courage by taking a stand and publicly addressing the risks that both fetuses
and pregnant women face, and by proposing practical means for addressing
and minimizing those risks.
Underlying the virtues of justice (which helps us recognize the goal),
prudence (which provides the means for acting justly), and courage (which
reinforces us as we take the action essential to reaching the telos), is the
virtue of wisdom. Wisdom provides the insight by which we come to un-
derstand who we are and where we ought to be (or, what we want to be-
come). It parallels prudence and works in tandem with it. In a virtue
ethics approach to abortion, wisdom guides us in our quest for understand-
ing who we are as individuals and what we want to become. In the Ameri-
can culture that is strongly characterized by the almost absolute right of
privacy, "which is so bound up with individual autonomy and isolation,"' 47
the focus of our individual and community attention on who we are can be
blurred. If it is blurred as Glendon and others suggest, it is difficult to
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id. at 26-27.
143. Id. at 29.
144. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 53-57.
145. MACINTYRE, supra note 108, at 179.
146. Id. at 116.
147. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 38; Colker, supra note 55, at 1066.
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identify not only who we are now, but also what we want to be in the
future.
That is why Cuomo urges the need for a wisdom to see what we are; as
he says, "the wisdom contained in the words, 'Physician, heal thyself.' "148
Cuomo identifies the need to increase our understanding, to broaden our
knowledge of who we are and what we want to be when he argues that:
Unless we Catholics educate ourselves better to the values that de-
fine, and can ennoble, our lives, following those [Christian social]
teachings better than we do now, unless we set an example that is
clear and compelling, we will never convince this society to change
the civil laws to protect what we preach is precious human life. Bet-
ter than any law or rule or threat of punishment would be the mov-
ing strength of our own good example, demonstrating our lack of
hypocrisy, proving the beauty and worth of our instruction.149
When this wisdom infects our consciousness, our knowledge of ourselves
becomes more secure and more certain. And, when our self-knowledge
grows, the vision of who we want to become both as individuals and as
communities will become all the more clear. And, when our knowledge of
who we want to become is better defined, our "moral idealism [can] be
found and maintained."' 150 Cuomo synthesized the goals of virtue and the
method to attain them when he stated: "We can be fully Catholic, proudly,
totally at ease with ourselves, a people in the world transforming it, a light
to this nation appealing to the best in our people, not the worst. Persuad-
ing, not coercing. Leading people to truth by love."'51 Joseph Kotva re-
minds us that a virtue ethic has rules. It offers guidance, it does not restrict
our freedom or development, and it moves us away from "the kind of be-
havior that excludes one from the pursuit of the common good."152 I now
turn to an investigation of the common good because it identifies the goal I
believe we should seek regarding the general question of abortion and the
more specific question of informed consent.
VI. THE COMMON GOOD AND THE QUESTION OF ABORTION
In the previous section, I examined the attractions of a virtue ethics
versus those of a principle-based ethics. When we examine abortion rights
rhetoric, we find that it is usually cast in a strong "principle language." As
a result of Roe, this language possesses the architecture of privacy and indi-
148. Cuomo, supra note 139, at 26-27.
149. Id. at 27.
150. Keenan, supra note 109, at 123.
151. Cuomo, supra note 139, at 31.
152. Kotva, supra note 111, at 169.
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vidual liberty, the hallmarks of the liberal state.153 But, as James Keenan
argues, we are in need of a virtue ethics because we need to rediscover the
sense of community "[iun our liberal society where individual rights have
replaced the common good."' 54 John Finnis has likewise commented on
the importance of community to the common good for "the common good
is the good of individuals living together and depending upon one another
in ways that favor the well-being of each."' 55 It is the sense of community
and the individuals who are the community on which this part of my exam-
ination will focus. My thesis here is that the concerns of the community
and the concerns of individuals are related and complementary through the
common good. In the context of the abortion debate, I see that the strongly
opposed views that favor either an absolute right to abortion or an absolute
right to protect the fetus do not promote the common good.
My examination of the common good is based on virtue ethics because
this approach raises questions that make us look at who we are, what we
want to be, and how we get there. By examining who we are, virtue ethics
can help reveal the problems with the strong individual-rights-and-liberties
orientation of our contemporary society. When we acknowledge that we
are often individual-rights promoters who fail to relate the interests of dif-
ferent individuals to one another, we can then acknowledge that something
is wrong: What do we do when rights that we have made "absolute" con-
flict with one another? We can address this question with the second stage
of the virtue ethics inquiry: What do we want to be? If we see that there is
a need to see ourselves as individuals in community rather than as isolated
beings independent of all others (in other words, we see ourselves as indi-
viduals in community), then we can ask the third question of virtue ethics:
how do we get there? A response to this inquiry is to acknowledge the need
for public discourse. I suggest that through engaging one another in public
153. A source of this contemporary liberal doctrine is MILL, supra note 92, at 197, where the
author states: "The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." Id. (em-
phasis added).
154. Keenan, supra note 109, at 123. The author continues-correctly and properly-that
the rediscovery of community today is urgent. The example he gives is the issue of abortion
because the two principal sides often rely on the "liberal" view of a strong rights-orientation
without abortion advocates trying to understand fully the interests of the fetus and without fetal-
protection advocates comprehending the concerns that women who have unwanted pregnancies
may face. Keenan's insight relates to the point that I later advance about the need for engagement
and dialogue.
155. FINNIS, supra note 95, at 305 (emphasis omitted).
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dialogue, we educate ourselves and make ourselves wiser to use virtue lan-
guage, in the needs of both ourselves as individuals and the needs of others.
I shall now develop this thesis more fully in four segments. The first will
refocus the abortion issue as it has emphasized absolute rights language
(which I suggest is, if not antithetical to the common good, is at least often
in conflict with it). Second, I shall briefly investigate the tradition of the
common good that has application to my thesis. Next, I shall focus on the
insights of contemporary authors who have made connections between the
rights of individuals as balanced by the needs of the community. Finally, I
shall make suggestions about how we can better address the abortion con-
troversy through our willingness to serve the common good under virtue
ethics.
A. The Abortion Issue Refocused
If I were to identify the major proposition that Roe contributes to the
issue of abortion, it would be this: There is a qualified right to privacy that
precludes the state from interfering with the right to terminate a pregnancy
during the first trimester." 6 As mentioned previously, the privacy right
was given to the attending physician, not the woman; the pregnant woman's
right was derivative of the physician's right.'57 However, with the passage
of time, the fundamental declaration of Roe became obscured. In this blur,
there appeared in the minds of some members of the Supreme Court and
abortion-rights advocates "the fundamental constitutional right of women
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy."' 58 In Casey, Justices Stevens
and Blackmun argued that the Pennsylvania informed consent regulation' 59
156. It is important to note that structuring abortion rights on the foundation of privacy was
and continues to be challenged by some abortion-rights advocates. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) (offering an "equal protection" argu-
ment); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 266 (1992) ("[ilt is clear that abortion-
restrictive regulation can violate the antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles which
give the constitutional guarantee of equal protection its meaning."); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality
in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 44 (1992) (stating that "laws restricting abortion violate the Equal Protection
Clause").
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 163-64 (1973), overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
158. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West Supp. 1990).
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unlawfully interfered with this "fundamental constitutional right."' 6 A
majority of the Justices (seven), however, found that the informed consent
regulation was valid and upheld it. 16
1
The Blackmun-Stevens approach to the resolution of abortion issues
strongly supports giving a pregnant woman absolute "reproductive auton-
omy" during the first trimester.1 62 One thrust of their argument is that
such autonomy is needed to ensure "both the concept of liberty and the
basic equality of men and women."' 16 In addition, they consider the right of
privacy to be "nothing less than a matter of conscience."'" Justice Stevens
suggested that regulations that "enhance the deliberative quality" of the
woman's choice are "neutral regulations on the health aspects of her deci-
sion," 1 65 but those that "influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth" are invalid.' 66 Stevens concluded that the informed
consent regulation in Casey constitutes an undue burden and therefore un-
lawfully interferes with the woman's "fundamental constitutional right" be-
cause it: (1) wears "down the ability of the pregnant woman to exercise her
constitutional right"; (2) rests "on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions
about the decisionmaking capacity of women"; (3) is premised on the as-
sumption that making the decision to terminate the pregnancy with an
abortion is made "lightly"; (4) serves no "useful and legitimate state pur-
pose"; (5) presents information "that is either common knowledge or irrele-
vant" and therefore is "irrational" and "undue"; and (6) places unnecessary
burdens on women who attempt to exercise "constitutional liberty," which
are therefore "undue."'' 67 Justice Blackmun shared Justice Stevens's criti-
cism of the informed consent regulation.
While acknowledging that the state "may take steps to ensure that a
woman's choice 'is thoughtful and informed,' "68 Blackmun found that the
160. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2841-43 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2843-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
161. Id. at 2822-31 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); id. at 2867-68
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Stevens
states, "The woman's constitutional liberty also involves her freedom to decide matters of the
highest privacy and the most personal nature." Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
164. Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986)).
167. Id. at 2841-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requirements of the Pennsylvania law were "rigid" and "biased." '69 In
agreeing with the district court judge, Blackmun considered the one-day
waiting period "clearly unconstitutional" because it might require two visits
to the attending physician that could increase travel time, provide further
exposure for anti-abortion protesters, and present additional financial
costs.1 70 Once again, Justice Blackmun relied on the foundation of privacy
rights to justify his attack on the state regulation. 171
True, the regulation makes a woman wait twenty-four hours before she
can abort the fetus; true, it requires in many cases that certain information
be presented to the woman; and true, it may require the woman to return to
the clinic, physician's office, or hospital a second time. But what the in-
formed consent regulation does not do, as Blackmun and Stevens suggest, is
to stop-or, to use the plurality opinion's language, place an "undue bur-
den" on-the woman from having a first trimester abortion if that is indeed
what she decides to do.
What the regulation does is present important information to the wo-
man who is about to make a momentous decision-to promote the virtue of
wisdom, or, as David Hollenbach suggests, to be "educated in virtue" by
other members of the community. 172 Unlike Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens, I view the Pennsylvania informed consent regulation as a major step
toward opening the dialogue-of increasing the virtue of wisdom-between
the woman who believes she wants to rid herself of the pregnancy and those
who have information which could show the pregnant woman that this may
not be what she wants if she is made aware of concrete alternatives such as
health care and financial support.173 The Pennsylvania regulation can open
a dialogue between each pregnant woman contemplating abortion and qual-
ified persons who, while respecting her position, also respect the position of
the developing human life of the fetus she carries.
The liberal understanding and emphasis on the right to privacy have
severe limitations, which Blackmun and Stevens ignore. In reality, a wo-
man who is pregnant is given little support by those advocating her right to
privacy. She may be in need of much more than her "right to be left alone."
She may be in need of others who can provide information or physical
assistance, which would enable her to have the child whom she would
169. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. David Hollenbach, S.J., The Common Good Revisited, 50 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 70, 77
(1989).
173. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 449; Cuomo, supra note 139, at 27-
29.
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rather keep, but physical circumstances (poverty, lack of proper health care
for her and her child) militate against her doing so. The right to be isolated
from others, which privacy conveniently makes available, could well be the
last thing she needs.
Ironically, both the interests of the woman and those of the fetus may
not be well served by the right of privacy. Yet this right is urged by* many
who subscribe to the liberal theory of society. Bruce Ackerman presented
one of the most comprehensive outlooks of the liberal position when he
stated in reference to abortion that:
The simple truth is that a fetus is not a citizen of a liberal state.
While it may possess a humanoid body, we have seen that citizen-
ship is not a biological category. A liberal community does not ask
what a creature looks like before admitting it to citizenship. Instead,
it asks whether the creature can play a part in the dialogic and be-
havioral transactions that constitute a liberal polity. The fetus fails
the dialogic test-more plainly than do grown-up dolphins.1 74
Ackerman's point focuses on political conversation and participation in
public discourse in which only some human entities-and perhaps dol-
phins-can participate. He excludes the possibility that a third person
could speak on behalf of the fetus (as the Pennsylvania regulation, in part,
does). Liberal states do not have room for dialogue-through-proxy. But,
the tragic irony is that this view of the liberal state offered by Ackerman
and others 175 disregards the need for all vital interests to be considered by
the state in a matter as important as that involving other human life that
would be adversely affected by this "fundamental constitutional right" to
privacy.
Decisions of this magnitude need to receive the participation and the
views of all vital interests that are at stake: those of the woman along with
those of the fetus. To insulate the decision-making of the woman as well as
the woman herself from the concerns and interests of those other members
of the human community, including those who are not yet but will shortly
be born, is to misappropriate the right to privacy by using it not as a protec-
tion for, but as a weapon against the moral interests of the community. As
Michael Perry has suggested, "moral deliberation requires community." 176
174. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 127 (1980).
175. See, e.g., Rachel Pine & Sylvia Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty:
Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 429 (1992) (offering
litigation strategies for "preserving privacy rights for women"); see also Robin West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 70 (1988) (discussing the need for a liberal response to
protect women against "invasions" such as pregnancy).
176. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, & LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 157
(1988).
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Perry further states that "[i]n constitutional deliberation, as in political de-
liberation generally, what is at issue ... is not what should I do? or how
should I conduct myself? but: how are we to 'be' together, and what is to be
the institutional setting for that being-together? ... It is not self-delibera-
tion about my life, but mutual deliberation conducted between agents impli-
cated in a common life." '177 There is little doubt that the question of
abortion places one important set of human values (those of the pregnant
woman whose existence is adversely affected by some, but not all,
pregnancies) against another important set (those of the fetus she carries).
The claim made on behalf of the woman's right to privacy and the exercise
of this right do not make this serious conflict disappear; it conceals it to the
detriment of the fetus. Perry further argues that: "Politics, then, in a mor-
ally pluralistic society, is in part about the credibility of competing concep-
tions of human good. Political theory that fails to address questions of
human good-questions of how human beings, individually and collec-
tively, should live their lives-is, finally vacuous and irrelevant."17
Recalling that he suggested that adult dolphins are more a part of the
dialogic process than human fetuses, 1 79 Ackerman argues that in a liberal
state, all forms of social dependence "are subordinated to the dialogic
processes of Neutral conversation."' ° By this, I believe he means that while
individual rights are developed through dialogue in a liberal state, these
rights seem to be developed more out of an arms-length negotiation process
that is disinterested in the other party's concerns as well as areas of mutual
concern. My conclusion about Ackerman's position is based on his state-
ment that:
Not only is each citizen of a liberal community free from any obliga-
tion to love his neighbor; he is even free to believe that his neighbor
is a despicable creature who is wasting his own life and corrupting
the lives of those stupid enough to call him friend. While citizens
will, of course, have available a rich store of associational networks
through which they may achieve their own forms of intimacy and
community, the fundamental bond that binds them all together is
not one of fraternity in any meaningful sense of the word. What is
forged instead is a bond that ties citizens together without forcing
them to be brothers; liberal conversation provides a communal pro-
cess that deepens each person's claim to autonomy at the same time
177. d at 156-57 (quoting RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 138-39 (1983)) (omis-
sions in original).
178. PERRY, supra note 176, at 182. Perry notes that "the protection of fetal life is surely
more than a trivial good." Id.
179. ACKERMAN, supra note 174, at 127.
180. Id. at 347.
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that he recognizes others as no less worthy of respect. Liberty,
Equality, Individuality are the watchwords of the liberal state. 8 '
I agree with Ackerman's assessment that there should be a communal
process involved in public life. I am also encouraged by his acknowledg-
ment that there are "others no less worthy of respect" than the autonomous
self. However, I disagree with his exclusion of developing human life from
his blueprint for the liberal society. He properly includes the important
elements of liberty, equality, and individuality that are essential to preserv-
ing individual and community life. What is conspicuous by its absence
from his plan is any appreciation of interdependence among individuals
that can be called fraternity. 182
Mary Ann Glendon has evaluated the political ideals vital to the liberal
state. 8 3 In her recent investigation of American political and social cul-
ture, she has noted:
[The] penchant for absolute formulations [of rights] . . .promotes
unrealistic expectations and ignores both social costs and the rights
of others. A near-aphasia concerning responsibilities makes it seem
legitimate to accept the benefits of living in a democratic social wel-
fare republic without assuming the corresponding personal and civil
obligations.
As various new rights are proclaimed or proposed, the catalog of
individual liberties expands without much consideration of the ends
to which they are oriented, their relationship to one another, to cor-
responding responsibilities, or to the general welfare.184
As if specifically referring to Ackerman's position, she notes that the En-
lightenment rights of life, liberty, and property are "preeminently rights of
separated, independent individuals," and that the separation of one individ-
ual from another has reached its apogee in the United States, "where 'lib-
erty,' and 'equality' did not rub shoulders with 'fraternity.' "18l5 Glendon
181. Id.
182. Ronald Dworkin suggests by using virtue and communitarian language that law is "a
fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are united in community though divided in project,
interest, and conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the people we want to be and the
community we aim to have." RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 413 (1986).
183. See GLENDON, supra note 82.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 47-48. Glendon notes that this separation began early in the history of western
democracies when
[t]he path of the United States diverged somewhat from those of most other Atlantic-
European nations... at each of [the] great watersheds in the history of rights. The parting
of the ways was already evident in 1789 when the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen, in contrast to the [American] Declaration of Independence, emphasized
that individuals have duties as well as rights.
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further argues that this peculiarly American twist of rights exaggeration has
manifested itself in the Supreme Court's recognition of "a protected sphere
surrounding the individual."1"6 Her commentary has particular relevance
to the notion of privacy often connected with a pregnant woman's "funda-
mental" or "absolute" right to have an abortion. Glendon points out that
while the "absoluteness" of this right is an illusion, it is "hardly a harmless
one" because the "absoluteness of our American rights rhetoric is closely
bound up with its other distinctive traits-a near-silence concerning respon-
sibility, and a tendency to envision the rights-bearer as a lone autonomous
individuaL"8 7
A major point advanced by the Pennsylvania informed consent regula-
tion is that it offers the pregnant woman (who is caught between the Scylla
of having an abortion and the Charybdis of being separated from others by
the exaggerated right of privacy) connections with other human beings who
can assist her to plan her future by showing her concrete alternatives to an
act that is irreversible both for her and her child. Unfortunately, many
rights advocates fail to appreciate that her pregnancy also concerns the
community, which includes her child. The shroud of the right of absolute
privacy conceals many of her vital needs that could be addressed by the
community, if only the community were given a chance. The Pennsylvania
law challenged in Casey is one attempt to give the community such a
chance to help both the woman and her child. This law advances the un-
derstanding that the political community is a "common project," a project
unfortunately "alien to the modem liberal individualist world." ' It is the
political community that I shall examine in the next section on the tradition
underlying the common good.
B. The Tradition of the Common Good
The concern about the common good as a social and political issue
reaches back to the classical era of ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotle
noted that "Every state is a community of some kind, and every community
is established with a view to some good."18 9 In looking at the state or the
political institution established to govern the community, he noted that just
governments are those "which have a regard for the common interest."19
In assessing what Aristotle considered to be just, we can turn to his dis-
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
186. Id. at 40.
187. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
188. MACINTYRE, supra note 108, at 146.
189. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 91, at 589.
190. Id. at 629-30.
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course on ethics in which he supplied the foundation of a theme we have
already seen: Justice is reciprocity and mutuality through relationship.19'
In placing the notion of reciprocity into the human community, Aristotle
contends that the truest or best form of justice is the reciprocal display of
friendship.' 92 The reciprocity found in this truest form of justice was ex-
pressed by Aristotle:
[Reciprocity] is the friendship of [people] who are good, and alike in
virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are
good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for
their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their
own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as
long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing.' 93
Although he was critical of the conditions of political community prac-
ticed in the ancient Rome of his time, Marcus Tullius Cicero shared the
sentiments of Aristotle when he suggested that a commonwealth or social
order emerges from the social spirit of people who make the commonwealth
their "property," which is established on the principles of "respect for jus-
tice" and "partnership for the common good." '194 Although writing for the
emerging Christian community, St. Augustine's view reflected those of Ar-
istotle and Cicero when he argued that the human race is not simply united
"in a society by natural likeness" but it is or should be "bound together by a
kind of tie of kinship to form a harmonious unity, linked together by the
'bond of peace.' ,,19 Augustine drew a distinction between the "earthly
city" and the "city of God," which has relevance to my investigation and
analysis of the privacy right that insulates the individual from the rest of the
community. Augustine's insight applicable today makes the distinction be-
tween the earthly city where self-love is supreme; in the other city, the civic
attitude is characterized by love of God and love of the neighbor.' 96
During the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, who was influenced by the
ideas of both Aristotle and Augustine, continued the work of identifying the
common good. For Aquinas, the object or telos of justice is to keep people
together in a society in which they share relationships with one another. As
he said, "justice is concerned only about our dealings with others."'197 The
notion of justice as being the mutuality or reciprocity shared among the
191. ARISTOTLE, supra note 91, at 433-34.
192. Id. at 502-03.
193. Id. at 506.
194. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 65 (1966).
195. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 547 (Henry Bettenson trans., 1986).
196. Id. at 593.
197. AQUINAS, supra note 97, Question 58, art. 2.
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members of society was further refined by Aquinas when he argued that
"the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby [each person] is
directed to the common good." '198 Furthermore, Aquinas stated as follows:
[T]he good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation
to himself or in relation to certain other individual persons, is refera-
ble to the common good, to which justice directs, so that all acts of
virtue can pertain to justice in so far as it directs [each person] to the
common good. 199
The modem Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain brought Aquinas's
understanding of the common good into the twentieth century. Maritain
recognized the need to separate the dignity of the individual human being
from the dangers of the primacy of the isolated individual and the promo-
tion of the private good. The common good, for Maritain, is "the human
common good," which includes "the service of the human person.""° In
large part, Maritain was responding to the threats posed to the dignity of
the human person by three forms of states that existed in the first half of the
twentieth century: (1) the bourgeois liberal state, (2) the communist state,
and (3) the totalitarian state. His concerns about the modem bourgeois
liberal state have special application to the abortion question.
Maritain concluded that "bourgeois liberalism with its ambition to
ground everything in the unchecked initiative of the individual, conceived
as a little God,"20 1 was a threat to the dignity of the human person and the
common good. As if responding to the arguments made by some abortion
advocates who claim the fundamental right of privacy on behalf of pregnant
women, Maritain stated that the emphasis on individualism at the expense
of community results in "the tragic isolation of each one in his [or her] own
selfishness or helplessness."2 "2 Through his perceptive understanding of the
social conditions of the times during which he wrote, Maritain acknowl-
edged that evil arises when "we give preponderance to the individual aspect
of our being."" °3 I believe that Maritain saw excessive individualism as an
evil because he understood that the human being, who is an individual, is
simultaneously a member of the human community. For Maritain, a con-
stitutive element of being human is the "inner urge to the communications
of knowledge and love which require relationship with other persons.""
198. Id. art. 6.
199. Id. art. 5.
200. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 29 (1966).
201. Id. at 91-92.
202. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id. at 47.
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Simply put, Maritain advanced the basic position (with which I agree) that
the human person and the community are not in conflict with one another
because their vital interests are complementary rather than contradictory.
The words of Maritain are compelling and insightful in this regard:
There is a correlation between this notion of theperson as social unit
and the notion of the common good as the end of the social whole.
They imply one another. The common good is common because it is
received in persons, each one of whom is a mirror of the whole....
The end of society is the good of the community, of the social
body. But if the good of the social body is not understood to be a
common good of human persons, just as the social body itself is a
whole of human persons, this conception also would lead to other
errors of a totalitarian type. The common good of the city is neither
the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole
which, like the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with
respect to its bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them
to itself. It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of
persons; it is their communion in good living.2" 5
Again, as if responding to the advocates of the liberal state and the exag-
gerated right of privacy, Maritain submits that the rights of the individual
human person and the interests of the community are compatible and har-
monious. The fundamental rights of persons and those of the society in
which each person lives shares as the principal value "the highest access...
of the persons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to
the communications of generosity consequent upon such expansion.
20 6
For Maritain, the expansion of each person's rights needs the community;
by one's self, cut off from the others, the person is alone and must fend for
the self. However, when in community, she or he can rely on the generous
support of others to be more, not less, of a human being. In the context of
the abortion issue, it would seem that the individuals most concerned (the
mother and the fetus) would be better served if society would do more to
help them. Programs providing concrete assistance to the mother would
205. Id. at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 51. While writing from the perspective of the eve of World War II, Jacques Mari-
tain stated that:
It is up to the supreme effort of human freedom, in the mortal struggle in which it is today
engaged, to see to it that the age which we are entering is not the age of the masses, and of
the shapeless multitudes nourished and brought into subjection and led to the slaughter by
infamous demigods, but rather the age of the people and the man of common humanity-
citizen and co-inheritor of the civilized community-cognizant of the dignity of the human
person in himself, builder of a more human world directed toward an historic ideal of
human brotherhood.
JACQUES MARITAIN, CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY 97-98 (1944).
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constitute attractive alternatives to abortion that are respectful of the inter-
ests of both the woman and the child whom she bears.
While Maritain's philosophy may present something of an ideal, it is
realistic in the sense that it is a goal-a telos -toward which our communi-
ties can strive. The Pennsylvania informed consent regulation contains ele-
ments of the generosity of one person helping another who needs assistance.
In the case of the woman who faces the problems of a pregnancy, there is
the support of the community-consisting of advice as well as information
about how to get concrete assistance-that can help her in a time of great
need. Without this regulation, the support of the community disappears,
and the pregnant woman is left alone with her right of privacy and the
isolation it brings as the only reward.
In the American context, Christopher Mooney has presented the view
that an underlying assumption of the United States Constitution is that "the
pursuit of the common good was and would continue to be a major motiva-
tion of all citizens.""2 7 Mooney is a realist who acknowledges that rights
emphasizing individuation and competition are not always conducive to the
common good because their intrinsic attitude enables conflict to prosper
and reconciliation to default.20 8 Commenting on this attitude, Glendon ar-
gues that the "overblown rights rhetoric" nurtures the autonomous individ-
ual and directs our "thoughts away from what we have in common and
focus[es] them on what separates us."20 9 For Glendon,
[T]he new rhetoric of rights is less about human dignity and freedom
than about insistent, unending desires [whose] legitimation of indi-
vidual and group egoism is in flat opposition to the great purposes
set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution: "to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, promote the general Welfare, and se-
cure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. 210
Glendon aptly illustrates her critique with an example taken from the legal
profession. She points to those advocates who rely on "exaggeration and
absoluteness" and neglect any other view, regardless of how legitimate or
how important, to win a case or to take over some company; on the other
hand is the "rank and file" counselor who recognizes that the client must be
protected but must also continue to live in relationships with others "that
depend on regular and reliable fulfillment of responsibilities. '211
207. CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER
OF RELIGION 59 (1986).
208. Id. at 60.
209. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 143.
210. Id. at 171-72.
211. Id. at 175.
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In their seminal work on individualism and commitment in American
life, Robert Bellah and his colleagues discovered during their research into
the American culture of the 1980s that "dependence and independence are
deeply related, and that we can be independent persons without denying
that we need one another." ' But these researchers, like Glendon, see that
the tendency of late twentieth century American individualism prompts cit-
izens to isolate themselves from their neighbors and to take care of "their
own," the result of which makes them suspicious of, and withdrawn from,
the public world.213 The language and the practice of individualism-above-
all-else has led to what Bellah and his colleagues have called the cardinal
sin of the Founders: "[W]e have put our own good, as individuals, as
groups, as a nation, ahead of the common good." ' 4 Nevertheless, the au-
thors of Habits of the Heart have identified an antidote to the poison of
individualism-above-all-else: The seeds of a renewal of a world waiting to
be born lay in the realization that "the processes of separation and individu-
ation [that] were necessary to free us from the tyrannical structures of the
past ... must be balanced by a renewal of commitment and community if
they are not to end in self-destruction or turn into their opposites. "215
Six years later, the same authors have found that the maxim "plus ga
change, plus ge le meme chose"2 6 is an accurate description of the status of
individualism and public commitment in the United States. In their most
recent work, The Good Society, they note that "to frame the abortion debate
only in terms of rights has been to inhibit realistic, morally engaged social
debate about the nature of abortion." '217 In referring to Mary Ann Glen-
don's work on the question of abortion in the United States, Bellah and his
collaborators argue that we as a nation cannot "deal realistically with the
conditions that lead to abortions on the one hand and the moral complexi-
ties of abortion decisions on the other" because our national urge to be
preoccupied with rights rhetoric "cuts off debate, polarizing society politi-
cally" between two groups unable to talk with one another.218
To conclude this section of the evolving tradition of the common good, I
turn to the work of Benjamin Barber. He also has concluded that the ex-
cesses of liberalism have led to an insularity among people that tends to
212. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 111 (1985).
213. Id. at 112.
214. Id. at 285.
215. Id. at 277.
216. "The more things change, the more they stay the same."
217. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 130 (1991).
218. Id.
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erode democratic institutions. He argues that being an individual and being
a citizen are compatible with one another:
Autonomy is not the condition of democracy, democracy is the con-
dition of autonomy. Without participating in the common life that
defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social
habitat, women and men cannot become individuals. Freedom, jus-
tice, equality, and autonomy are all products of common thinking
and common living; democracy creates them.219
As seen elsewhere, protection of the human person in all of his or her dig-
nity requires insertion and participation in, not insulation and separation
from, the community. The community prospers when its members contrib-
ute of themselves in making it prosperous; it withers when they turn within
and tend only to their private cares.220 The threat to a free world of the
good citizen is stated as:
The world in which men and women do not exist for others; in
which there can also be no public goods. In this world, there can be
no fraternal feeling, no general will, no selfless act, no mutuality, no
species identity, no gift relationship, no disinterested obligation, no
social empathy, no love or belief or commitment that is not wholly
private.22
1
Like other contemporary writers who have addressed the issue of the
common good, Barber also turns to the abortion question and the issue of
privacy to illustrate his concern with the erosion of democracy and its vital-
izing force of citizenship. Engagement of people with opposing views is
essential to resolving the issue and of reconciling differences caused by "ab-
solutizing" positions. Barber warns:
Unless the debate over abortion permits people to discuss the social
conditions of pregnancy, the practical alternatives available to the
poor, and the moral dilemmas of a woman torn between her obliga-
tions to her own body and life and to an embryo, such debate will
treat neither pregnant women nor unborn babies with a reasonable
approximation of justice.222
David Hollenbach has raised his hope that the search for "communitar-
ian objectives" is not incompatible with the achievements of and progress
219. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE at xv (1984).
220. Barber continues by stating, "From this precarious foundation [of individualism and
privacy], no firm theory of citizenship, participation, public goods, or civic virtue can be expected
to arise." Id. at 4.
221. Id. at 71-72.
222. Id. at 182.
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for humanity up to the present age.223 I submit here that his concern is
legitimate, and his theory is supported by others who recognize that our
world and our national community of today are established on the interde-
pendence of individual human beings. We seem to do better, if not prosper,
when the spirit of fraternity and cooperation prevails. We suffer (as we do
in our abortion clinics, in Somalia, in Bosnia) when the spirit of isolation
and separation reigns. It is important, to be sure, to pay attention to the
individual who cries out, "Look at me! I'm different." It is equally impor-
tant when we do so, however, to also say, "Look at us! We are the same."
In the next section of my discussion, I shall focus on how the issue of
the common good emerges in the abortion debate when we look at the "me"
and the "us."
C. Current Perspectives on Abortion That Relate to the Common Good
Within the present day context of abortion, we can identify the "me" in
the debate as those individuals and groups who hold what I call absolutist
positions on the issue. The example on the pro-abortion side could well be
the pregnant woman whose own life has been threatened by a difficult preg-
nancy. On the other side would be the devoted individual who holds the
view that all human life is sacred and that no other human being has the
right to take such life, especially the life of the fetus. I am confident that in
between these two positions, most if not all the other positions, which can
be viewed as pro-abortion, pro-choice, or pro-life, fall. The "us" generally
would include all members of the specific society or community that is con-
cerned about the abortion issue. I suggest that the community or society
might be composed of several levels that, in addition to the woman and her
baby, include the hospital or other medical center that treats pregnant wo-
men, the woman's family, the state that has (or may be developing) a pro-
gram for regulating abortion, the national government that has (or may be
developing) a program to regulate abortion, and any other groups that have
come together to express and advocate their views about abortion in public
arenas.
One avenue for proceeding into the contemporary scholarly debate on
abortion is through the work of Judge John Noonan.224 Judge Noonan has
taken the Jewish 22' and Christian 226 scriptural admonition "to love your
223. Hollenbach, supra note 172, at 94.
224. Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
225. Leviticus 19:18.
226. In the New Testament, the command to love your neighbor as yourself is found at Mark
12:30, Matthew 22:39, and Luke 10:27. The Golden Rule ("do unto others as you would want
them to do to you") is found at Matthew 7:12.
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neighbor as yourself" and put the fetus into the position of the neighbor so
that the fetus's life can arguably have parity with one's own life.227 In order
to be of greater appeal to secular interests, Noonan recasts his argument by
saying that the religious commandment has its humanistic counterpart:
"Do not injure your fellow [hu]man without reason.1 228 He goes on to say
that:
In these terms, once the humanity of the fetus is perceived, abortion
is never right except in self-defense. When life must be taken to save
life, reason alone cannot say that a mother must prefer a child's life
to her own. With this exception, now of great rarity, abortion vio-
lates the rational humanist tenet of the equality of human lives.229
However, even this humanist approach can fail to convince some individu-
als that the life of the fetus is like mine or yours. This has prompted one
commentator to point out that the British Parliament recently rejected leg-
islation ensuring that medical practitioners delivering a fetus capable of sus-
taining life outside of the womb be required to protect its life at the
conclusion of the abortion.23°
Ronald Dworkin has also examined the question of how to consider the
status of the life of a human fetus. He readily admits that "it seems undeni-
able that in the ordinary case a fetus is a single living creature by the time it
has become implanted in a womb, and that it is human in the sense that it is
a member of the animal species homo sapiens"; however, the protection to
be accorded this human interest in Dworkin's estimation is quite another
matter.2 31 After making this observation, Dworkin proceeds to liken fetal
human life to a piece of sculpture, or the assemblage of Dr. Frankenstein's
monster, or a baby carrot: He suggests that smashing the sculpture, de-
stroying the mechanism that would vitalize Frankenstein's monster, or
picking the baby carrot prematurely are no different than aborting the fetus
227. John T. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABOR-
TION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 58 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. John Finnis has recently noted that this humanist approach did not appear to move the
British Parliament into taking legislative steps to help a fetus sustain his or her life in the perform-
ance of an abortion. See John Finnis, The Legal Status of the Unborn Baby, 43 CATH. MED. Q. 5
(1992). There the author relates the following legislative tactic: "In the final stages of Parlia-
ment's consideration of the 1990 amendments to the Abortion Act, a Conservative woman peer
moved two amendments intended to secure that when an abortion is being performed under the
Abortion Act..., the medical practitioner doing the termination should use 'all reasonable steps
to secure that the child is born alive.' Each amendment was comfortably defeated." Id. at 7.
231. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 397 (1992).
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before the third trimester.232 His grounds for making this comparison rest
on his premise that the fetus's interests parallel those of the sculpture, the
baby carrot, and the monster because "nothing has interests unless it has or
has had some form of consciousness-some mental as well as physical
life." 23
3
Dworkin anticipates arguments against his analogy by referring to the
"fallacious argument that abortion must be against the interests of a fetus,
because it would have been against the interests of almost anyone now alive
to have been aborted. ' 234 Dworkin then goes on to suggest that a fetus may
develop interests in retrospect, and he draws upon the following
illustration:
[T]hat it was good for [Dworkin] that [his] father was not sent on a
long business trip the night before [his] parents conceived [him],
rather than, as in fact happened, two days later. It does not follow
that it would have been bad for anyone, in the same way, had
[Dworkin's father] left on the earlier date. There never would have
been anyone for whom it could have been bad.2 "
Dworkin argues that if he were not conceived because his father had left for
the business on the earlier date, there would be no Ronald Dworkin who
would have interests. But Dworkin's argument fails because it makes sup-
positions that disregard the facts. His father did not leave early; Ronald
Dworkin was conceived; Ronald Dworkin had interests that would have
been adversely affected if his mother decided to have an abortion. And
what might that interest be? No Ronald Dworkin among many other
things, including his impressive scholarship.
Dworkin relies on one further example to make his point, but this exam-
ple fails as well. He argues: "[I]f a woman smokes during pregnancy, some-
one will later exist whose interests will have been seriously damaged by her
behavior. If she aborts, no one will exist against whose interests that will
ever have been."1236 If the woman aborts because of natural causes, that is
one thing; however, if she willingly and knowingly terminates her preg-
nancy, that is quite another. In this latter case, the woman who smokes or
drinks or takes dangerous drugs (all of which can adversely affect her child
who is still in her womb) and then voluntarily aborts is like the person who
commits a murder and then tries to remove the evidence by burning the
body and dissolving the ashes in acid. Dworkin's basic argument seems to
232. Id. at 402-03.
233. Id. at 403.
234. Id. at 404.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 405.
[Vol. 76:701
ABORTION, ETHICS, AND THE COMMON GOOD
focus on the ability of a born human because it has "some form of con-
sciousness-some mental as well as physical life." '23 7 Patricia King has an
important counter to this problematic reasoning. She points out that
neither fetuses nor newborn infants nor comatose adults have "conscious-
ness," yet there are important interests worth protecting in each of these
cases.238 John Hart Ely, who holds a pro-abortion position, has indirectly
pointed out the fallacy of Dworkin's reasoning:
Dogs are not "persons in the whole sense" nor have they constitu-
tional rights, but that does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing
them: It does not even mean the state cannot prohibit killing them
in the exercise of the First Amendment right of political protest.
Come to think of it, draft cards aren't persons either.239
Dworkin's approach to the issue of abortion is troublesome. He at-
tempts to eliminate the fact that the fetus is a human entity who has vital
interests that are worth discussing and protecting. Perhaps in some cases
these rights are not absolute because there are other rights involved-par-
ticularly those of the mother whose own existence may be compromised in
a small number of cases by the fetus. That is my point; that is Glendon's
point. We cannot afford to look at one interest and neglect the other com-
peting interests that are simultaneously involved. Rosalind Hursthouse has
cast the issue involved here well. In a recent article, she relies on virtue
theory not to "solve the problem of abortion" but to illustrate how we
ought to "think about it."2" I suggest that how we think about the interest
of the fetus cannot be the fashion in which Dworkin casts the reflection: It
is wrong to say that an interest that once was, never was if it is destroyed
(as Dworkin implies in the case of abortion). To borrow from Hursthouse,
we must think about what it is we are doing before we do it; then, we must
talk about what it is we contemplate doing before we do it. To act in a
prejudicial way toward the fetus by aborting it, and then think about it and
talk about it ex post facto and say that it never was because it no longer
exists is not only illogical, it is also wrong.
Patricia King has taken a thoughtful approach in considering how we
think and talk about the interests of the fetus. She concludes that the viable
fetus (one capable of life outside the womb) has a greater interest in protec-
237. Id. at 403.
238. Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of
The Unborn, 77 MICH. L. Rnv. 1647, 1669 (1979).
239. John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
926 (1973).
240. Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 233
(1991).
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tion than the previable fetus because, in her view, "the fetus should not be
entitled to the same degree of protection at every stage of development." '24 1
While I do not concur with this particular judgment she makes, I do join in
her more general opinion that this does not mean that the previable fetus
has no interests at all worth protecting. King asserts that the previable
fetus does have interests and those interest merit discussion and protection.
As she states, "the unborn fetus, the newborn child, and the mature adult
are all at different stages of development, and the fact that a fetus is not
conscious or socially responsive should not preclude all legal protection."'242
But how do we discuss the level of protection to be given the fetus?
And, how do we discuss the level of protection to be given the mother? If
the rights and interests of the fetus change, might we not expect that those
of the woman undergo change as well? Alan Brownstein and Paul Dau
have recently argued that a proper assessment of the abortion issue necessi-
tates our realization that the pregnant woman's interests are not static but
vary during pregnancy:
[T]he woman's right also varies during pregnancy and that this
change in interest shifts the balance of state interests against funda-
mental rights in many cases. Indeed, if the woman's interest in ter-
minating her pregnancy declines to a sufficient extent, the balancing
necessary to justify abortion restrictions may be accomplished with-
out determining exactly when the conceptus experiences a life worth
living.243
How we go about evaluating the interests of the principals, vis-A-vis the
woman and the fetus, can only be achieved by frank and honest discussion
among all of us who hold a substantive view on abortion. Ruth Colker has
offered some helpful insights on how this kind of discussion can proceed.
Although she is a feminist who holds pro-choice views, Colker nevertheless
acknowledges that women have responsibilities along with rights when the
subject of abortion is examined. 2" She further acknowledges that the right
to an abortion cannot be grounded in disrespect for the fetus. 245 Colker
calls upon the woman considering abortion to appreciate the virtue of wis-
dom needed to make a decision that is not only important to herself but to
241. King, supra note 238, at 1673.
242. Id. at 1672.
243. Alan Brownstein & Paul Dau, The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33 B.C. L. REV.
689, 749 (1992); see also Cahill, supra note 122, at 87, where the author argues that the woman's
and fetus's "respective rights must be defined in relation to one another (and, in a less immediate
sense, to the rights of others, for example, family members)." Id.
244. Colker, supra note 55, at 1050.
245. Id. at 1055.
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the fetus as well.246 But a pregnant woman does not obtain this wisdom in
the vacuum of her privacy and isolation from others. She obtains the wis-
dom she needs through dialogue with others. As Colker argues:
I oppose a complete prohibition of abortion regulations, because it
would prevent the state from developing mechanisms to encourage
women to consult other people. I would support legislation requir-
ing hospitals and clinics that perform abortions to make available
group counseling sessions... for all pregnant women so that they
can be exposed to competing viewpoints in a safe space.24
This is basically what the Pennsylvania informed consent regulation is all
about. Another feminist who is pro-life, Lisa Cahill, has emphasized the
need for community and individual understanding that the respective rights
of the mother and the fetus must be defined in relation to one another.24
"Where those rights can conflict, neither can be absolute. The rights of
both are limited, but still significant.' 249
Laurence Tribe has made a recent contribution to the debate and dia-
logue on abortion. He is somewhat critical of informed consent regulations,
which he believes can be burdensome to some women, especially those from
rural areas. He does not think that these kinds of regulations can "serve
their ostensible purpose of fostering consideration of the gravity of a deci-
sion to abort a pregnancy. "25' He rhetorically asks the question: "What
woman who would take lightly the decision to have an abortion will rethink
it more seriously simply because a law says she has to wait a day before
having the procedure?" 2s  While Tribe displays no enthusiasm for this kind
of informed consent regulation, neither does he find the harsh, one-sided
rhetoric helpful in the effort to reconcile the absoluteness of some pro-life
and pro-choice advocates. I doubt that he finds the threat made to legisla-
tors of "[t]ake our rights, lose your job"2 2 a conducive way of attempting
to reconcile the differences. After all, Tribe demonstrates his appreciation
of the need to inject abortion alternatives, such as the "humane options" of
pre- and post-natal care and education about human reproduction.25 3 Re-
views of Tribe's approach are mixed; however, both Michael McConnell 254
246. Id. at 1063-64.
247. Id. at 1066 (citation omitted).
248. Cahill, supra note 122, at 87.
249. Id.
250. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 203.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 179.
253. Id. at 209-12.
254. Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1991) (reviewing TRIBE, supra note 53).
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and Stephen Carter2" agree with Tribe on the need for public discourse and
dialogue on the divisive issue of abortion. McConnell, while arguing that
Tribe's position fails to do this, nevertheless finds the general project of
moving beyond the clash of absolute positions about abortion to be a "wor-
thy purpose." As he suggests, "There is too much shouting and too little
serious discussion of the law and morality of abortion. 25 6 Carter, while
giving reasons why dialogue may not resolve the question "in the near
term," nonetheless generally agrees that discussion and examination of al-
ternatives to abortion are vital to resolution of the conflict.2" 7 I will con-
clude this section of my presentation with the advice given by Michael
Perry on the subject of political dialogue.
Perry believes that the goals of the liberal state which are based on indi-
vidualism and privacy have proved to be futile.258 The alternative he con-
structs begins with what Perry terms "deliberative, transformative politics"
in which he calls for members of American society to engage one another
"in productive moral conversation." '259 Perry has taken recent steps to de-
velop more fully this process of public dialogue:
[He proposes the need for] a politics in which citizens meet one an-
other in the public square, sometimes to reach consensus, more often
diminish dissensus, and most often, perhaps, simply to clarify, to
better understand, the nature of their disagreement, but always to
cultivate the bonds of (political) community, by reaffirming their ties
to one another, in particular their shared commitment to certain au-
thoritative political-moral premises.260
Of course, for politics to be effective, it must include more than talk, more
than public discourse and dialogue on the pressing issues of the day, and.
Perry acknowledges this. But in doing so, he emphasizes that the need for
"dialogue and tolerance" he advances has to be more than something that
will be "devalued and marginalized. '2 61 The dialogue and tolerance Perry
finds necessary to deal with the difficult public issues of the present day are
the kind that will nourish "a form of political community in which,
notwithstanding our sometimes radical disagreements with one another
[perhaps like the disagreements that surround abortion], we always strive to
understand one another, to know one another, to serve one another, better
255. See Carter, supra note 3.
256. McConnell, supra note 254, at 1181.
257. Carter, supra note 3, at 2763-65.
258. PERRY, supra note 176, at 55-56.
259. Id. at 4.
260. PERRY, supra note 54, at 125.
261. Id. at 144.
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than we now do."' 2 62 Perry's understanding of dialogue, tolerance, and a
community in which individuals sincerely work at understanding, knowing,
and serving one another leads into my own reflection about the common
good that underlies the subject of abortion.
D. Abortion and the Common Good: Coming to Know Ourselves
In constructing my own understanding of the common good in the con-
text of the abortion debate, I return to the informed consent regulation. I
do so with the goal of determining whether Perry's notion of "dialogue and
tolerance" can help us understand the important human issues at stake,
and, if so, how we can then go about addressing them. I conclude that
Perry's approach, which shares elements of the works of other authors I
have investigated, can help construct both (1) an understanding of the com-
mon good and (2) how it can be advanced. Both constructions rest on a
foundation in which the underlying, diverse views come together and share
their individual perspectives. Both perspectives must be considered in order
to ascertain what is, if not the best solution to the problem, then a better
solution than we have now.
While there may be problems of communication in defining solutions to
moral issues like abortion and identifying a "shared notion of virtue or the
common good" as Mary Ann Glendon acknowledges, this does not mean
that the public decision-making in which we as citizens engage one another
can "remain resolutely neutral on all controversial questions involving
moral issues." '263 With the deep insight that characterizes much of her
work, Glendon argues that "it is only natural that ideas of law as embody-
ing a social dialogue should come to have a special appeal." 2  I would add
that not only does social dialogue have "special appeal," but that it is ur-
gently needed in order for American society to begin the construction of
helpful, concrete solutions to the divisive issue of abortion. Only then can
we properly take into account the variety of significant and valuable inter-
ests that now seem to be insulated from one another by the cries of absolute
rights, which are increasing rather than diminishing in volume. Glendon
states that "it does not seem too soon to say that although modern law
cannot establish or enforce a single vision of virtue, it can play its part in
promoting the potentially self-correcting processes of dialogue and
dialectic."26
262. Id. at 145.
263. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 139.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 140.
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The Pennsylvania informed consent regulation at the heart of the Casey
decision is one reasonable approach to facilitate dialogue and dialectic in
the abortion controversy. While some critics of the Pennsylvania regulation
argue that it imposes an "undue burden" on pregnant women,266 in reality,
it presents an opportunity for pregnant women to consider that there is an
important interest of another, as well as her own, at stake. The attending
physician must first of all inform the woman at least twenty-four hours
before the abortion about the nature of the proposed procedure, the proce-
dure's risks, the estimated age of the fetus, and the medical risks to her
associated with carrying the child to term.2 67 The information is presented
orally, which is more expeditious than requiring the woman to read some
document that may be written in technical language and difficult for a per-
son not schooled in the language of the health care profession to
understand.
The second component of the twenty-four hour waiting period man-
dates that prior to the abortion, either the physician or some other qualified
person designated by the physician informs the woman about state publica-
tions containing information on alternatives to the abortion, information on
medical assistance (including prenatal, child birth, and postnatal care), and
information that the father is liable for support (even if he has offered to pay
for the abortion). An exception to this last component is in cases of rape.268
It is significant to note that this section of the informed consent regulation
gives the woman the option to review printed materials; if she exercises that
option, the materials are provided free of charge. If she does not elect the
option, she only receives the information verbally.269 Prior to the abortion,
the woman signs a form certifying that she has received this information.
270
What she does with the information is left up to her: She can consider it,
she can discuss it with others during the twenty-four hour period, or she
can disregard it. The choice is hers alone.
It is important to acknowledge that in cases of a medical emergency,
2 71
the physician is under a duty to explain to the pregnant woman, if possible,
the medical indications supporting his or her judgment about the medical
266. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2851 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Pine & Law, supra
note 175, at 411.
267. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
268. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
269. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
270. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
271. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West Supp. 1990) defines "medical emergency" as that
"condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the
medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy
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emergency and why the "abortion is necessary to avert her death or to avert
substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function."2 72
I do not suggest that this regulation is the most desirable for giving
equal consideration to the interests of the woman and those of her child
when an abortion is being considered. These provisions are weighed heavily
in favor of the woman's interest notwithstanding the charges of some that
they constitute undue burdens. Still, this regulation is one small step in the
direction of opening a dialogue between the two principal interests that are
at stake; moreover, it encourages some measure of tolerance on each side of
these interests to understand the concerns of the other party.
To draw from Mensch and Freeman, I suggest that the Pennsylvania
informed consent regulation is a step toward putting aside the abortion per-
spective of "rational secular individualism" in favor of a more generalized
appeal toward the common good of appreciating and balancing (ever so
slightly) the significance of competing interests.2 73 The Pennsylvania regu-
lation is only the first step in the direction of helping women see the moral
issues, the issues of conscience that are a vital part of the abortion debate.
As Mensch and Freeman also state, the rights-based language of Roe and
other pro-abortion advocacy "fails to capture the moral and social experi-
ence of many women. "274
In the realm of the practical, the informed consent regulation in Casey
helps to educate a woman about concrete alternatives she may have in lieu
of proceeding with the abortion. Verbally, she is given information about
health care and other financial support options. These options reflect some
of the practical alternatives to abortion mentioned by Governor Cuomo. 275
Ironically, many pro-abortion advocates term their movement the "pro-
choice" position. But what real choice is there in taking the narrow view
that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion; this is not a position
of choice, it is rather a position of absoluteness without alternative. On the
other hand, the Pennsylvania scheme gives the woman some real choice
that includes the choice to terminate or to continue the pregnancy with the
assistance of counseling, health care, and other support. Again, as Mensch
and Freeman point out:
[E]ven for those [pregnant women] not facing extreme economic
hardship, there are other social pressures that can give one the expe-
to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible
impairment of major bodily function."
272. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(b) (West Supp. 1990).
273. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1095, 1105.
274. Id. at 1123.
275. Cuomo, supra note 139, at 27-29.
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rience of having "no choice." Those pressures include an internal-
ized feminist pressure to be successfully autonomous and
independent, and, as pro-life advocates have argued with some force,
male pressure for women to be sexually available without reproduc-
tive consequences....
"Choice" contains its own coercions, in other words, which may
be a necessary price to pay but should not go unnoticed. Ironically,
it is the pervasiveness of the language of choice and freedom in our
culture which makes a forthright examination of those coercions so
legally and politically out of bounds.276
It is worth noting that Mensch and Freeman are wife and husband who
have either had abortions or have been the responsible other in abortions.2 77
They speak with the conviction of understanding that comes from experi-
ence. They now present that experience so that others may share their un-
derstanding of what is at stake in an abortion. For them, the starting point
for discussion is the discussion itself; the discussion then must move into
recognition that abortion is about "life or death., z7  They acknowledge
that "[t]o abort a fetus is to kill, to prevent the realization of human life."'279
In pointing to the circumstances of the 1991 war against Iraq, Mensch and
Freeman opine that the choice:
[T]o kill does not make it wrong on that score alone; but we surely
need a vocabulary for talking about life and death issues in moral
terms that underscore the seriousness of any choice for death. Our
experience with abortion, and, perhaps with war, suggests that the
lack of such a vocabulary will lead inevitably to excess.28 °
I find it necessary to take the conclusion of Mensch and Freeman at least
one step further: Once we discover the vocabulary, we must use it. More-
over, its use must be regular and frequent. With the dormancy of the vo-
cabulary comes the insularity of the conversationalists; and with their
insularity comes the isolation of individualism that makes one person (or
one interest) forget the concerns of the other.
At its most fundamental level, that is what the common good is all
about: the one being with the other, the me with the you. Ruth Colker and
Michael Perry both refer to the scriptural commandment to love your
neighbor as yourself.281 Their recognition of this scriptural commandment
276. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1125-26 (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 933-34.
278. Id. at 1137.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1137-38.
281. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 54, at 50-5 1; Colker, supra note 55, at 1075 (quoting Leviti-
cus 19:15-18).
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is important because the command makes us intimately aware of our simi-
larities as human beings. But, specifically, what does the commandment
mean in the context of abortion and the debate about it?
I think it means this: When we are willing to discuss the question of
abortion, we can and often do learn a lot more about the subject, especially
when we are talking with others who hold different views. As we dispose
ourselves to engage one another in a difficult but still important discussion,
we come together in a community that does not necessarily share the same
views but that does share the same interest in this topic. As a community,
we can build a foundation of recognition that we have something in com-
mon (our humanity that begins and ends in the same way: with life and
death). This mutual interest forges the foundational link between us and
helps us recognize that we share a "likeness to one another. ' '2 82
Some of us may be reluctant to approach this recognition of likeness
with the other because it seems incompatible with our individuality and
freedom. Yet, as Philip Rossi has noted, the mistake we often make about
ourselves and our freedom is that "we conceive of freedom primarily, if not
exclusively, by reference to human agents in their individuality and inde-
pendence, rather than in terms of their shared human communalities and
their fundamental interdependence." '283 While many of us think that it is
our independence that makes us human, it is really our social dimension,
the fact that we are individuals who are members of a society, that we are
distinct human beings who nevertheless flourish when we relate to one an-
other-not when we are isolated from one another. It is, after all, our inter-
dependence that brings us together into the community of human beings.284
Community fosters exchange between people (and their interests). The ex-
change, in turn, promotes the opportunity to see that human interaction is
mutually beneficial, that it serves and promotes our common good to "care
for one another's total well-being. "285
282. PHILIP J. Rossi, S.J., TOGETHER TOWARD HOPE: A JOURNEY TO MORAL THEOLOGY
viii (1983).
283. Id. at 5.
284. As Philip Rossi argues:
This community is, first and foremost, a community of mutuality: a community of those
who conscientiously foster the skills that enable the essential interdependence of their lives
to work for the attainment of good for one another. Mutuality fostered in this way consti-
tutes the core of the charity or love that in the Catholic tradition has been claimed to be
the fundamental form of the life of virtue. Thus the human community that provides a
condition fundamental for satisfying, for each and all, our basic human cravings is a com-
munity in which charity gives form to virtue.
Id. at 68.
285. Id. at 145.
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I enter the conclusion of this Article (but not the debate, nor the discus-
sion) on abortion by drawing our attention to one final insight from Rossi.
Rossi's notion of the common good emerges from "the recognition of com-
munality at the heart of moral life: 'I am as she; she is as I., ,2816 He trans-
fers this fundamental point into the abortion controversy when he states:
"[A]cceptance of abortion by our contemporary culture has as one of its
major engendering factors the massive failure of many of the practices of
our social, political, and economic life to establish, foster, and be at the
service of human mutuality. '2 87
This brings me to the my last words. The notion of the common good
that I have attempted to present in this discussion about abortion (and I
suspect of applicability to many other issues that challenge the human com-
munity today) is this: When we engage one another in conversation, we can
and do learn about one another. We learn what we did not know before;
often, we also learn what we thought but what we did not want to admit.
We discover that we are different because that is what makes us individuals.
But, more important, we discover-and this is the part that is not easily
admitted-that we are also similar in many ways. Each time we engage the
other in conversation, we see a reflection of ourselves in the other. I suspect
that our rights-oriented culture reinforces the differences that superficially
make us different but, in truth, mask our fundamental similarity. We dis-
cover our resemblance each time we engage one another in conversation, in
dialogue, even debate. We see in each of our conversations a piece of a
mosaic that reflects the other. And, when we assemble more of the mosaic,
as we see more of the pieces come together, not only do we see the other, we
also see ourselves.
This is how the questions about abortion and the common good come
together: The more we discuss these issues, the more we see that the con-
cerns of the pregnant woman are our concerns. And, just as significantly,
when we hear about the concerns of the fetus, we see the concerns that
belong to us. For in the fetus, in the mother, we see another human being
with whom we have so much in common. And when we see that other
human being, we see ourselves. When we make this discovery, when we
allow it to seep into our deepest consciousness, we can then acknowledge
that the portrait that emerges from our many conversations belongs to all of
us because it represents all of us. It is both our portrait and the portrait of
the other.
286. Id. at 154.
287. Id. at 155.
[Vol. 76:701
